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When joint owners of oil and gas and other mineral interests come to a
parting of the ways, they often fid that breaking up their undivided interests
can be hard to do.' The legal process through which joint owners break up
their undivided ownership is known as partition, a concept with roots in thir-
teenth century England.' Applying this ancient concept of partition to undivid-
ed joint ownership of modem oil and gas and other mineral interests presents
many interesting problems. Because both partition and the nature of legal inter-
ests either in oil and gas or in other minerals vary from jurisdiction to juris-
diction in the United States, it makes sense to focus specifically on how parti-
tion operates with regard to such interests in one particular state. This article
focuses on Texas, which is a jurisdiction with a modem system of joint owner-
ship combined with partition procedures which are in some respects surprisingly
little changed from those in thirteenth century England. This odd mixture of
joint ownership law applies to Texas' complex and highly fractionated oil and
gas and other mineral interests. The resulting legal framework can make
breaking up Texas oil and gas and other mineral interests particularly difficult.
This article considers partition in one of its most complex applications, the
1. With apologies to Neil Sedaka, whose song, "Breaking Up is Hard to Do," topped the popular record
charts in 1964.
2. Partition appears to date back to the reign of Henry III, around 1272 A.D. A. FREEMAN, COTENANCY
AND PARTMION (1872). The idea of the need for a process to divide up undivided ownership has even earlier
origins, for example in Roman law. W. H. Lloyd, Partition, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 162 (1919). Partition was
extended to all forms of joint ownership except tenancies by the entireties by Henry VIII in 1539 and 1540.
31 Henry VIII Ch.l (1539) and 32 Henry VIII Ch.32 (1540).
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many varieties of oil and gas and other mineral interests recognized under Tex-
as law. Although Texas has a relatively simple and straight-forward system of
joint ownership, Texas partition processes are often cumbersome and unpredict-
able, especially when applied to oil and gas and other mineral interests. How a
modem jurisdiction, such as Texas, struggles with applying the ancient property
process known as partition in this particularly sophisticated and technical con-
text is the story this article will tell. Both property lawyers and mineral, oil and
gas lawyers will find the story intriguing. On one side, property lawyers often
find Texas interests in minerals, oil and gas fiendishly complex and perplexing-
almost as if the jointly owned property to be partitioned seems capable of frac-
tionating into virtually infinite regression. On the other side, mineral, oil and
gas lawyers sometimes encounter partition as an arcane and somewhat unpre-
dictable ordeal. Partitioning jointly owned oil and gas and other mineral inter-
ests in Texas is worth looking at from both perspectives.
Part I of this article discusses the nature of joint ownership law as it has
developed in Texas. Part II focuses more particularly on the application of joint
ownership to various types of oil and gas and other mineral interests. The right
to partition, sometimes described as an absolute right, which accompanies every
joint owner's fraction of undivided ownership is the focus of the Part III. Part
IV examines some of the details of Texas' compulsory partition procedures.
Part V considers some of the consequences of partition, particularly with regard
to title and taxes. Agreements not to partition jointly owned oil and gas and
other mineral interests are the focus of Part VI. Investigating the intersection
between venerable property law concepts and the technical world of Texas oil
and gas and mineral law is the purpose of this exploration of partitioning oil
and gas and other mineral interests in Texas.
I. JOINT OWNERSHIP IN TEXAS
For those familiar with the intricacies of Texas' system of mineral, oil and
gas ownership, Texas law regarding joint ownership interests seems refreshingly
simple and basic. In considering how these two areas of law interrelate, the best
place to begin is with Texas' relatively simple approach to joint ownership
interests.
A. A Single Form of Joint Ownership
Texas has a remarkably straight-forward concept of joint ownership. When
there are multiple owners, each of whom individually owns an undivided, paral-
lel and simultaneous fraction of something, that is joint ownership.3 The oppo-
site of joint ownership is technically called "ownership in severalty," an archaic
term which is still used by lawyers to refer to what non-lawyers call "ownership
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: JOINT OWNERSHIP (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1997).
1998]
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by a single owner" or "sole" or "separate" ownership. Property which can be
jointly owned includes almost anything which can be owned, from intangible
property, to land and other real property interests, including all varieties of
mineral, oil and gas interests. The Texas approach to joint ownership law is
quite different from the joint ownership regimes of other jurisdictions, which
recognize several categories of joint ownership to which numerous implicit
rights and obligations attach.4 Texas simply recognizes a single common law
form of joint ownership and attaches to that single form of joint ownership
relatively few implied rights and obligations
Texas' one common law form of undivided ownership is usually called
joint ownership, although Texas courts sometimes use "tenancy in common,"
"cotenancy" and occasionally "co-ownership" interchangeably with "joint own-
ership".' Texas never recognized other common law forms of joint ownership,
such as joint tenancy, tenancy by the entireties or coparcenary, but rather sim-
ply found joint ownership to be sufficient. In other states, survivorship is an
automatic characteristic of other forms of common law joint ownership, such as
joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety.7 However, in Texas, survivorship
is something which joint owners may choose.' Texas law does not attach survi-
vorship as an automatic, presumed feature of joint ownership. The intrinsic
characteristics of joint ownership in Texas are (1) more than one owner, (2)
undivided, simultaneous ownership and (3) if the jointly owned property in-
volves possession, the susceptibility of that undivided ownership to partition.9
Antiquated common law concerns about unities of time, title, interest and pos-
session, which still complicate court decisions with regard to joint ownership in
other jurisdictions, are virtually absent from Texas decisions regarding joint
ownership law."0 Undivided simultaneous ownership by multiple owners whose
rights are individually held, but parallel and coextensive throughout the jointly
owned property, is simply joint ownership in Texas.
Aside from the implicit right to partition, which is the primary focus of
this article, joint owners of possessory interests in real and personal property
4. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.44-554.45; DeYoung v. Mesler, 130 N.W.2d 38 (Mich.
1964); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSrS LAW 6-2.2; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60 § 74; Swanson v. Swanson, 250
P.2d 40 (Okla. 1952); WYO. STAT. § 34-1-140, Choman v. Epperly, 592 P.2d 714 (WTyo. 1979).
5. The Texas Constitution and statutes also provide for a community property form of marital owner-
ship. But community property is a statutory form of undivided ownership which differs in many ways from
joint ownership. As will be discussed in greater detail below, Texas decisional law is not completely clear
with regard to whether or not Texas' joint management community property should be considered to be an
additional form of partitionable joint ownership. See infra at notes 22-30.
6. The Texas Supreme Court has used three of these terms within a single sentence: "It may sometimes
be inequitable to one or more of the joint owners if another co-owner is permitted to enforce partition of the
jointly owned property; but this is one of the consequences which one assumes when he becomes a co-tenant
in land." [Emphasis added] Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1943).
7. See examples supra note 5.
8. See Spires v. Hoover, 466 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Even Texas'
statutory community property law permits choice regarding "survivorship community property" under TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (West 1997).
9. See 16 TEX. JUR. 3D, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 9 (1997).
10. See Spires, 466 S.W.2d at 347.
[Vol. 33:705
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have few other automatic rights and duties which derive from the joint owner-
ship arrangement itself. A joint owner in Texas has duties not to commit waste,
not to exclude another joint owner, and to account for profits derived from
payments made by third parties for the use or possession of the jointly owned
property.' But a joint owner is neither an agent nor a fiduciary for another
joint owner, unless the relationship among the joint owners also involves a
confidential relationship. Instead of front-loading the joint ownership arrange-
ment with ownership-based legal rights and obligations, Texas law emphasizes
the capacity of joint owners to agree about such matters as survivorship and
even waiver of partition rights. The simple structure of Texas joint ownership
interests is a model for modem joint ownership law in emphasizing choice and
self-determination by joint owners. Joint owners are empowered to choose those
legal rights and obligations which best suit the joint owners' particular desires
and circumstances. This straight-forward single concept of joint ownership
carries with it relatively few mandatory rights and liabilities and leaves plenty
of room for agreement and independent action by joint owners. These joint
ownership qualities have been extremely useful in the development of oil and
gas and other minerals in Texas. Highly nuanced agreements among joint own-
ers have played an important role in fostering such development. 3
B. Not All Shared Ownership Is Joint Ownership
Joint ownership is the only common law form of multiple ownership in
Texas. However, it is not the only legal structure which permits multiple own-
ers to share ownership of Texas minerals, oil and gas. 4 In part because the
ever-present potential for partition can make joint ownership somewhat prob-
lematic, many other types of legal arrangements in which ownership of mineral,
oil and gas interests can be shared are often preferred over joint ownership. For
example, shared ownership can take the form of divided shares of corporations,
limited partnerships, or limited liability companies, which hold oil and gas or
mineral properties. 5 These corporate or limited partnership shares represent
separately owned divided investment interests in entities which are usually
managed independently of the shareholders or partners. In these instances, the
entity owns the property; and the shareholders or limited partners own the enti-
11. See 16 TEX. JUR 3d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 10, 25-27 (1997).
12. Mining partnerships may involve something like fiduciary duties among partners. However, in Texas,
although mining partnerships often include joint ownership, mining partnerships also have other essential
features, such as joint management and operation of property as part of a joint enterprise. Of course, Texas oil
and gas law recognizes a strong fiduciary relationship between the owner of the executive right and royalty
interests in a mineral estate. See Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984); Hawkins v. Twin
Montana, Inc., 810 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex. App. 1991). But such a fiduciary obligation is not extended to
apply among co-equal joint owners. Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Zapata Partnership, 12 F.3d 480 (5th
Cir. 1994).
13. Such joint owner agreements play important roles in sophisticated oil and gas arrangements, such as
pooling and unitization.
14. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, 2 OIL AND GAS LAW § 501 (1996).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: JOINT OWNERSHIP § 1 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1997) 1.
1998]
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ty. In contrast, the direct and undivided, aggregate ownership interests of joint
owners do not operate through an entity. 6
Trusts are another common vehicle for divided, as opposed to joint, owner-
ship. A trust divides ownership between the trustee, who holds legal title, and a
beneficiary, who holds equitable title. 7 Easements, real covenants and
servitudes are other alternative arrangements in which an owner of real property
may split off various types of rights regarding use of real property. Security
interests, such as mortgages, represent yet a different way to split up property
ownership into separate types of property interests. Successive interests, such as
life estates, remainders and defeasible fees, also may divide ownership accord-
ing to time of possession. But these present and future interests lack both the
simultaneity of ownership and the undivided, coextensive rights characteristic of
joint ownership. Texas mineral, oil and gas law also recognizes a variety of
economic rights in the form of oil payments, net profits interests, overriding
royalties, non-participating royalties and the like. 8 None of these economic
interests which permit investors to share in the economic risks and benefits of
mineral, oil and gas development is joint ownership, because none involves
undivided possession.' 9 Various types of non-working oil and gas interests are
mechanisms for sharing ownership. But their owners do not jointly own prop-
erty with the working interests, because these different types of interests lack
the coextensive and parallel rights which are essential attributes of undivided
joint ownership.?0 Moreover, although non-working interests are often jointly
owned, joint ownership of such non-possessory interests is generally not
partitionable.2 '
C. Community Property
In addition to a single common law form of joint ownership, Texas has a
constitutionally based statutory form of undivided property ownership among
married persons in the form of a community property system.' Whether or not
16. For tax purposes, common law joint ownership is sometimes viewed as the ultimate pass-through
entity. Actually a joint ownership arrangement is a non-entity, because joint ownership entails direct, aggre-
gate ownership without an intermediate entity.
17. RESTATmENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 1-6 (renative Draft No. 1, 1996).
18. See HOWARD R. WILUAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, 8 OIL AND GAS LAW (1997). See generally
E.E. SMrt & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 24 (1991) [hereinafter SMIH &
WEAVER].
19. 16 TEX. JUR. 3d, Cotenancy and Partnership § 5 (1997).
20. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Blankenship, 256 S.W.2d 700 ('rex. Civ. App. 1953).
21. See discussion infra notes 56-61; Douglas v. Butcher, 272 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954, writ
ref'd n.r.e); Lane v. Hughes, 228 S.W.2d 986 (rex. Civ. App. 1950, no writ).
22. Texas statutes which govern community property were recently recodified in Title 1 of the Texas
Family Code. See 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 7 (S.B. 334) Whenever married people acquire property in
Texas, the usual statutory presumption is that, unless the spouses agree to the contrary, the property is treated
as joint management community property. Under Texas' constitutionally based statutory community property
system, each spouse is also capable of owning separate property. In Texas, separate property may include
joint ownership interests in property which had been jointly owned by the spouses before their marriage. See
Halamka v. Halamka, 799 S.W.2d 351 (rex. App. 1990). Sole management community property is held in the
name of and controlled by one spouse. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(a) (West 1997). However, most
property acquired by married people in Texas is presumed to be joint management community property. See
HeinOnline  -- 33 Tulsa L.J. 710 1997-1998
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Texas community property should be treated as a form of joint ownership
which may be partitioned is a matter about which Texas appellate courts appear
to disagree. 3 Since mineral, oil and gas property is frequently owned by mar-
ried persons in Texas, a brief explanation of this uncertainty is probably war-
ranted. The specific issue about which Texas appellate courts are divided is
whether or not joint management community property should be treated as if it
were joint ownership which involves individually held interests susceptible to
independent transfer or partition. Texas statutes recognize community property
partition agreements, which can transform joint management community proper-
ty owned by both of the spouses into separate ownership by one of the spous-
es.24 But such mutual reallocation of community and separate property is un-
like common law partition which breaks up undivided ownership into separately
owned parts.
During marriage, spousal interests in Texas joint management community
property have usually not been considered to be individually held shares, but
rather the property of the community.2s Community property theorists tend to
view Texas community property as involving ownership by the marital commu-
nity during marriage, without individual spousal shares susceptible to unilateral
transfer or partition.26 However, some Texas appellate courts have held that,
during marriage, Texas community property operates as if it were joint owner-
ship in which each spouse owns an undivided half of joint management com-
munity property which can be unilaterally conveyed. In Williams v. Portland
State Bank, the Court of Appeals concluded that, during marriage, a husband
could unilaterally convey his half of joint management community property.'
While the spouses were married, the wife refused to execute a note and deed of
trust in both spouses' names on two parcels of land owned by the spouses as
community property. The husband then executed a new note and deed of trust
prepared in his name only. The next week, the wife filed for divorce. The prop-
erty settlement which accompanied the couple's divorce awarded the wife title
to the two parcels. When the husband failed to make payments on the note, the
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.52(c) (West 1997).
23. Compare Williams v. Portland State Bank, 514 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) with Dalton v.
Don L. Jackson, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App. 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.52(c) (West 1997): "At any time, Texas spouses may partition or ex-
change between themselves any part of their community property, then existing or to be acquired, as they may
desire."
25. See Ware v. Ware, 809 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App. 1991). At the end of a marriage by death or divorce,
joint management community property automatically becomes jointly owned. If the marriage ends when one
spouse dies, the deceased spouse's estate and the surviving spouse each own one-half of the property. If the
marriage ends in divorce, the property settlement usually divides joint management community property be-
tween the former spouses into separately owned shares. Id. However, divorced spouses sometimes retain undi-
vided ownership of parts of the community estate which have been transformed by the dissolution of the mar-
riage into ordinary joint ownership. See, e.g., Carter v. Charles, 853 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App. 1993).
26. See, e.g., Thomas M. Featerston, Jr. & Julie A. Springer, Marital Property Law in Texas: The Past,
Present and Future, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 861, 890 n.169 (1987); Joseph W. McKnight, Annual Survey of
Texas Law: Family Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 88-89 (1975).
27. 514 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, writ dism'd).
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 33 Tulsa L.J. 711 1997-1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
bank foreclosed.s The Court of Appeals ruled that the husband's independent
execution of the note and deed of trust during the marriage created a prior and
valid lien on his undivided one-half community property interest in the real es-
tate.' The bank was permitted to foreclose with regard to that half, leaving the
ex-wife with an undivided one-half interest in the real estate, unencumbered and
unforeclosed, but jointly owned with the bank. The Court of Appeals treated the
husband's conveyance of the deed of trust during marriage as binding on his
half interest in the joint management community property, as if the husband's
community property interest were an ordinary joint ownership interest."
Eleven years later, in Dalton v. Don L. Jackson, Inc., Another Court of
Appeals came to a contrary conclusion." In Dalton, a contract to sell some
real estate which was joint management community property had been prepared
for both spouses' signatures. Although one spouse signed the contract, the other
spouse died before signing. The district court enforced the contract against the
signing spouse's half interest; but the Court of Appeals reversed and expressly
declined to follow Williams. The Dalton court held that "Community property
may only be partitioned upon compliance with the provisions [of the Texas
Constitution and Family Code.] ... Accordingly, one spouse may not convey
his or her interest in joint [management] community property to a third party,
so as to effectuate a partition by creating a tenancy-in-common between the
remaining spouse and the third party."'
So far, the Texas Supreme Court has not resolved this issue, nor is there a
reported appellate decision which has applied either the Williams or the Dalton
approach to Texas oil and gas or mineral interests held as joint management
community property. For now, Texas law remains uncertain whether, during
marriage, an individual spouse's share of mineral, oil or gas interests held as
Texas joint management community property, will be treated as a joint owner-
ship interest which can be unilaterally conveyed and partitioned. For present
purposes, it is important to recognize the possibility that the partition processes
described in Parts III and IV, infra, might apply to joint management communi-
ty property if such community property is treated as if it were jointly owned.
28. Id. at 125-26.
29. Id. at 127.
30. Id. A later Court of Appeals decision, Vallone v. Miller, 663 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tex. App. 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) distinguished Williams in a decision regarding a contract to convey some land held as joint man-
agement community property. The contract, which was prepared for the signatures of both Mr. and Mrs. Mill-
er, was signed only by Mr. Miller, but not by Mrs. Miller, who had died. The Court of Appeals decided that,
since the contract had been prepared for both signatures, it was incomplete. "There is no basis for a finding
that James B. Miller alone must specifically perform the incomplete contract as to his undivided one-half
interest" was the court's ruling. Id. at 98-99.
31. 691 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App. 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. Id. at 768. In a later case, yet another Court of Appeals noted, "Most commentators have agreed with
the Dalton court that the conveyance of a spouse's undivided one-half interest in community property to a
third party violates these constitutional and statutory provisions because it is an attempt to involuntarily parti-
tion community property." Marriage of Morrison, 913 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1995, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)
[Vol. 33:705
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II. TEXAS OIL AND GAS AND OTHER MINERAL INTERESTS
In contrast to Texas' relatively straight-forward approach to common law
joint ownership, Texas law recognizes a bewildering variety of oil and gas and
mineral interests. From the perspective of partition, there are two distinct cate-
gories of jointly owned mineral, oil and gas interests: possessory real property
interests (including working interests in oil and gas leases) which are subject to
partition, on the one hand, and nonpossessory interests (such as royalty inter-
ests) which are not partitioned, on the other hand. The different treatment of the
two categories is based on the presence or absence of undivided possession. It
is a difference which reflects the focus on physical possession which underlies
Texas' distinctive ownership-in-place approach to oil and gas as well as other
mineral interests.33
Texas' distinction between possessory and nonpossessory interests operates
within a concept of a unitary fee simple absolute title to real property. Into this
unitary fee, Texas law fits a number of different categories of estates and sub-
categories of interests. Since the later parts of this article primarily focus on
how partition works, most of this part will primarily concentrate on the pos-
sessory oil and gas and mineral interests which are subject to partition.
Oil and gas interests are a subcategory of mineral interests, which in Texas
are governed by the ownership in place doctrine 4 Minerals on and under the
surface, as well as the oil and gas temporarily "in place" under the surface are
treated as separate possessory subparts of a unitary fee simple title. 5 The right
to capture which accompanies ownership in place permits an owner of land to
bring fugitive resources such as oil and gas to the surface, where they can be
sold as personal property.' This right to capture attaches to full fee ownership,
unless the right to extract the minerals, oil or gas has been severed from the
surface either in whole or in part. There are several ways in which a fee owner
can sever the minerals or convey the right to capture them: by conveyance of
the mineral estate; or by conveyance of the surface estate while retaining the
mineral estate; or by leasing all or some of the minerals, for example through
conveyance of an oil and gas lease.37 These interests (mineral estate, surface
estate, mineral lease) as well as the full fee simple are all possessory interests
which, if jointly owned, can be partitioned. The personal property used in min-
eral, oil and gas development, such as production equipment, drills, pumps and
pipes, is also susceptible to joint ownership and can also be partitioned as pos-
33. Texas embraces the common law notion that an owner of real property in fee simple owns all as-
pects of the land, from the depths of the earth to the heavens. Practical, physical differences between immo-
bile minerals and oil and gas, which tends to move around, make the ownership rights to the latter particularly
distinctive under the "right to capture" doctrine followed in Texas law.
34. See Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915).
35. See generally 1 SNMit & WEAVER, supra note 18 at § 2.3 (1995); JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS
LAw 34 (3d. ed. 1995). Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. 1 SM1T & WEAVER, supra note 18 at § 1.3.
37. See generally B.M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpretting Mineral Deeds and Leases: An
Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (1993).
1998]
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sessory personal property.'
A. Possessory Oil and Gas and Other Mineral Interests
In Texas, the owner of a fee simple absolute title from which the mineral
estate has not been severed, or the owner of a severed mineral estate which
includes the leasing right, or the owner of the leasing attribute of the mineral
estate (if that attribute has a different owner or owners) can convey a mineral
lease. 9 Under Texas law, a mineral lease is treated as a conveyance of a deter-
minable fee in the leased minerals (frequently a 7/8 interest).' The possibility
of reverter, as well as a royalty interest (frequently a 1/8 interest) in the miner-
als produced from the leased property, remain with the owner of the mineral
estate.4
Assuming that a joint owner's leasing attribute (often called the executive
right) has not been conveyed or restricted, Texas law permits each joint owner
of any of the interests which hold the leasing attribute to lease the joint owner's
undivided share of the minerals to a different mineral lessee.' With regard to
oil and gas interests, each lessee from a different joint owner holds a separate
working interest, which conveys to that lessee an undivided right to explore and
to produce from the jointly owned property. Lessees from different joint owners
are not considered to be joint owners inter se, although they hold similar, undi-
vided rights to extract minerals, or oil and gas, from the same real property.
Rather, each lessee from a different joint owner can exercise his or her lessor's
undivided right to capture the oil and gas under the jointly owned property.
Once a joint owner conveys a mineral or oil and gas lease to a lessee, that
lessee may convey undivided fractions of the lease to another layer of joint
owners, who share undivided interests in the lease.43 Unless the leasing attrib-
ute is concentrated in a single manager by agreement among the joint owners,
the potential for multiple competing lessees is significant.
The Supreme Court of Texas explained the basis for the legal relationship
among multiple working interests in oil and gas leases of different segments of
a very small (0.4 acre) parcel of land in Ryan Consolidated Petroleum Corp. v.
Pickens." In Ryan, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed lower court rulings re-
jecting a claim by the owners of a mineral lease in two lots in a four-lot tract
which was four-tenths of an acre in size. The claimants were held not entitled
to half of the production from a well which had been drilled on the other two
lots under an earlier exclusive oil exploration and production lease.' The sub-
38. TEx. R. Civ. PRo. 773 (West 1967 & Supp. 1997).
39. See 55 TEX. JUR. 3D, Oil and Gas §§ 161-162 (1996).
40. See I SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 18, at § 4.1(A) (1994).
41. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982); W.R. Waggoner Estate
v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Tex. 1929).
42. See 55 TEX. JUR. 3d, Oil and Gas §§ 19-20 (1996).
43. See discussion infra notes 65-69.
44. 285 S.W.2d 201 ('rex. 1955).
45. Id. at 210.
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sequent grant of a mineral lease of the second two lots to the claimants only
conveyed to them an undivided 7/8 of the minerals under those particular sec-
ond two lots.' Although it was uncertain at the time of the later lease whether
Texas Railroad Commission rules would permit an offsetting well to be drilled
on the second two lots, the mineral lessees of the second two lots had no right
to demand half of the production from the first two of the four lots in the par-
cel.47
The Supreme Court of Texas explained that in Texas, 'The rule of capture
is simply this-that the owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and gas
which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though part of the oil or gas may
have migrated from adjoining land." The court relied on Japhet v. McRae,49
a 1925 Texas Commission of Appeals decision in which a landowner sold a
portion of his land to others, and later leased the land which he retained for oil
and gas development. The Commission of Appeals noted:
As our Supreme Court has held, oil is fugitive in its nature, and ordinarily
should belong to him who captures it and brings it to the surface. The
quest for it involves tremendous expense and a vast element of chance. In
spite of the scientific knowledge of the geologists, the industry still par-
takes largely of a gamble. It seems to us that the only safe rule, and the
only one free from much confusion, is the one which gives the oil to the
man who owns the land upon which the well is located.'
The Commission's ultimate ruling was that the royalties belonged to the lessor,
who was owner of the reatined tract where the well was located.
In addition to recognizing distinct ownership of different types and forms
of minerals, Texas law also recognizes division of land ownership horizontally
into various strata measured by depth 1 Sometimes a different set of joint
owners owns each horizontal slice. These horizontally divided strata, or hori-
zons, which lie above or below each other within a single mineral estate, are
considered distinct objects of ownership. The relationship between the owner of
one stratum and the owner of a different stratum is not undivided joint owner-
ship. Rather, each of the strata's owners has rights to a different piece of real
property.'
Although all of the many different types of mineral, oil and gas interests
recognized in Texas can be, and often are, jointly owned, partition applies only
to joint ownership of those interests which involve undivided possession: the
full fee simple, the surface estate, the mineral estate and the mineral lease.
46. Id. at 206.
47. Id. at 209-10.
48. Id. at 207.
49. 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. 1925).
50. Id. at 671-72.
51. See, e.g., Gilbreath v. Douglas, 338 S.W.2d 279 ('ex. Civ. App. 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e).
52. See generally 1 SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 18, at §§ 3.3(A)(2), 3.8 (C)(3) (1989).
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B. Nonpossessory Oil and Gas and Other Mineral Interests
In Texas, joint ownership also applies to royalty and other intangible at-
tributes of mineral estates, as well as to oil and gas interests of many types.
Joint ownership of these nonpossessory interests is often created through partial
assignments of fractional shares of these interests. 3 Although Texas law treats
royalty interests and several other attributes of the mineral estate as distinct
nonpossessory real property interests, such jointly owned nonpossessory inter-
ests are not partitioned through compulsory court processes." Professor John
Lowe aptly suggests that royalty interests are "probably similar to incorporeal
hereditaments," a category which includes easements, profits and real cove-
nants. The Restatement, Third, of Property calls such nonpossessory interests
"servitudes." In the oil and gas context, they are production-related interests
which do not involve undivided possession and are therefore not partitioned.
They function as subparts of ownership, rather than undivided joint owner-
shipY In addition to the royalty attribute of the mineral estate, discussed
above, there are various other types of specialized royalties and economic inter-
ests in mineral and petroleum production, or the profits from that production
All of these non-working interests can be, and frequently are, jointly owned.
Since they are intangible rights, which do not involve undivided possession,
they are not partitioned. Instead, unless there are contractual restrictions on their
transfer, intangible rights are routinely transferred, often, in whole or in frac-
tional parts. Joint ownership of these intangible interests arises as these interests
are subdivided by joint owners who transfer fractional parts of them, for exam-
ple through partial assignments of royalties.59
The Texas Supreme Court recently explained the nature of five
nonpossessory interests included within the mineral estate: "A mineral estate
consists of five interests: 1) the right to develop, 2) the right to lease, 3) the
right to receive bonus payments, 4) the right to receive delay rentals and 5) the
right to receive royalty payments." Each of these nonpossessory interests can
53. See, e.g., Royal Petroleum Corp. v. Dennis, 332 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. 1960). See discussion in text,
infra at notes 62-69.
54. See, e.g., Douglas v. Butcher, 272 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e). See also I
SMrrs & WEAVER, supra note 22, at § 4.1(A) (1994); Williams, The Effect of Concurrent Interests on Oil
and Gas Transactions, 34 TEX. L. REV. 519, 541-42 (1956).
55. 6 WEST'S TEXAS FORMS (J.S. Lowe, ed. 1997) at 57.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (Introduction to Tentative Draft No. 1, 1989).
57. The splintering of ownership among different types of surface, mineral and nonpossessory interests
can result in very complicated arrangements, particularly with regard to lands in which the State of Texas re-
tains mineral interests, after the surface long ago transferred into private ownership. For example, under a
series of Sales Statutes, large tracts of Texas mineral lands came to be owned by surface owners, such as
ranchers, with the mineral interests retained by the State of Texas. However, various aspects of the oil and gas
interests, including royalty, delay rental, bonus interests and the like, are jointly owned 50/50 by the owner of
the surface and the State of Texas. The surface owner also has the power to lease, subject to the consent of
the State. Cf. 1 SMrrH & WEAVER, supra note 18, at § 2.3.C (1996).
58. J.S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223 (1996).
59. See discussion in text infra notes 62-69.
60. French v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. 1995), citing Altman v. Blake, 712
S.W.2d 117, 118 (rex. 1986).
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be separately conveyed, as well as jointly owned. The Texas Supreme Court
noted that "[W]hen an undivided mineral interest is conveyed, reserved or ex-
cepted, it is presumed that all attributes remain with the mineral interest unless
a contrary intent is expressed."6' Any of the five attributes can also be jointly
owned by fractional owners of undivided interests in that particular attribute.
But joint owners of such nonpossessory interests do not have the right to com-
pel partition. Although Texas courts have repeatedly held that nonpossessory
interests are not partitionable,63 Texas statutes and court decisions do not di-
rectly discuss why nonpossessory interests are not partitioned. The apparent
reason why these nonpossessory interests are not considered partitionable is
because the traditional function of partition is to divide the unity of possession.
In the absence of undivided possession, partition seems unnecessary. Apparently
only when there is undivided possession which needs to be broken up does
compulsory partition have a role to play.64
C. Fractionalization
Texas oil and gas and other mineral interests have tended to generate com-
plicated patterns of both possessory and nonpossessory joint ownership inter-
ests. Because the capital and know-how required to bring mineral, oil and gas
interests into production are substantial, a "piece of the action," in the form of a
joint ownership interest in the land, the mineral estate or the mineral lease, has
been a common practice in Texas from the earliest mineral production in the
state.6 Moreover, corporations and their subsidiaries may decide to split up
ownership of mineral, oil or gas interests into undivided fractional interests
jointly held by various subsidiaries.
For much of this century, this tendency to fractionalize has been a topic of
considerable discussion and litigation, most recently with regard to the treat-
ment of fractional interests in oil or gas as securities. In the context of securities
regulation, Professor Louis Loss aptly described the fractionalization of a royal-
ty interest:
61. Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, 786 S.W.2d 667, 669, n.1 (Tex. 1990). When each of the five at-
tributes has a different owner, the five owners are not joint owners because their interests are divisions of the
mineral estate, rather than undivided interests.
62. See French, 896 S.W.2d at 797. The Court in French struggled with interpreting a conveyance of a
1/656.17 of a mineral interest, from which had been reserved all development rights, leasing rights, bonuses,
and delay rentals. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that "what is conveyed is a fraction of royalty, not a
fixed fraction of total production royalty." Id. at 798. The court treated the royalty attribute as a separate
subpart of the mineral interest; and it was that subpart only which was held in undivided joint ownership.
63. See Belgam Oil Co. v. Wirt Franklin Petroleum Corp., 209 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948);
Hardin v. Eubank, 25 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Newcomb v. Blankenship, 256 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953). Cf. Indian State Oil Co. v. McCutchen, 183 S.W.2d 692 (rex. Civ. App. 1944) (partitioning
joint ownership of a 7/16 interest in a working interest).
64. This feature of Texas partition law seems to be a rare instance in which Texas law reflects the com-
mon law unities associated with common law concurrent estates. See discussion supra note 6. Cf. Maria E.
Mansfield, A Tale of Two Owners: Real Property Co-Ownership and Mineral Development, 43 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. § 20.02 (1997).
65. See William D. Warren, Transfer of the Oil and Gas Lessee's Interest, 34 TEX. L. REV. 386, 388
(1956); A.J. THUSS, TEXAS OIL AND GAS (1929).
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This one-eighth interest is the "landowner's royalty interest," and it com-
monly finds its way into the securities markets in lots of fractional undi-
vided portions after having been transferred to banks as collateral for
loans or having been sold to an oil royalty dealer. The lessee's interest is
termed the "working interest" If the lessee is an established producing
company, it may retain all of the working interest On the other hand, if it
does not have independent resources, it may sell fractional undivided
shares of the lease to raise working capital, or it may give a part interest
in the lease to a drilling contractor, who in turn may sell all or part of his
share to finance the drilling."
The 1933 Securities Act defined "a fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or
other mineral rights" as a "security." But because this definitional section
also provided that the context of such an interest might indicate that the particu-
lar interest was not a security, litigation over possible exceptions to treatment of
fractional interests in minerals, oil and gas as securities has continued. Judge
Higgenbotham noted about ten years ago that "[s]ophisticated purchasers of
fractional undivided interests in oil and gas have sought-and obtained -
rescission of their purchases pursuant to the 1933 Act for at least thirty
years." In short, fractionalization of interests in minerals and in oil and gas
can have a number of practical commercial ramifications unrelated to partition.
Fractionalization of mineral, oil and gas interests among joint owners also
arises in noncommercial situations. Donative transfers, including inter vivos and
testamentary gifts, as well as inheritance, generate many types of joint owner-
ship interests. Moreover, as noted earlier, much of the property acquired by
married persons in Texas is community property, which in many cases ultimate-
ly will be split into undivided joint ownership halves when the marriage ends
either by death or by divorce. For example, assume that 1,000 acres were ac-
quired by a husband and wife and automatically became community property.
When the husband died, he willed his half of the community property to a
group of four relatives. His surviving wife later died intestate, with her half
passing to her heirs, five additional persons. Such a scenario would result in
ownership of the 1,000 acre ranch by nine different joint owners within a single
generation. Each of the nine joint owners can lease her or his undivided interest
in the minerals to a different lessee, or three can lease to a first lessee and six
can lease to a second lessee. Both the first lessee and the second lessee can
convey undivided interests in their working interests to yet other joint owners,
through partial assignments of their leases. Upon the death of one of the joint
owners of a fraction of the mineral lease, the fractional interest in the mineral
lease will be distributed according to the deceased's will or under the inheri-
tance statute. Each royalty interest which was retained under each of the miner-
al leases may be conveyed or devised to joint owners, or perhaps inherited by a
66. L. Loss, SECURImS REGULAION (1961) at 469.
67. Section 2(1) of the 1933 Securities Act.
68. Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988).
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group of joint owners.
In short, fractionalization of mineral, oil and gas interests derives from
many sources. It results in very complicated patterns of both jointly owned
interests and partial interests. This multiplicity of jointly-owned interests charac-
teristic of Texas mineral, oil and gas property makes construing joint ownership
interests in mineral deeds and oil and gas leases particularly challenging.'
Dealing with this fractionated universe of joint ownership interests requires not
only very close attention to the language and intent of deeds and leases, but
also a strong grasp of fractions.
III. PARTIoN iN TEXAS
Without a way to break up undivided interests, joint owners could be
locked together indefinitely in an unworkable joint ownership arrangement.
Partition enables a dissatisfied joint owner to disentangle his or her possessory
rights from those of the other joint owners, but still retain ownership of an
equivalent fractional part of the asset or the asset's value. In the United States,
compulsory partition and joint ownership have traditionally been interdependent
concepts. For example, the two concepts are joined in the title to the only trea-
tise regarding United States joint ownership law, Cotenancy and Partition writ-
ten by the well-known western legal scholar regarding the law of judgments,
A.C. Freeman."'
In Texas, the symbiosis between compulsory partition and joint ownership
remains a matter of considerable practical importance. Without partition, joint
ownership could become intolerable, leaving disagreeing joint owners in a
hopelessly indivisible situation. Partition provides a way out of dysfunctional
joint ownership arrangements by breaking up the undivided whole of jointly
owned property into separately owned parts, either physically, in kind, or in
terms of a share of the proceeds from selling the jointly owned property. In
most situations, when a dissatisfied joint owner seeks sole ownership of a
smaller part instead of undivided ownership of a larger whole, the alternatives
to partition are not very attractive. Aside from continuing to put up with joint
ownership, a dissatisfied joint owner can choose between partition and selling
his undivided interest.
Selling an undivided interest in real property is frequently undesirable
because potential purchasers are often reluctant to buy into a joint ownership
arrangement, especially a troubled one. As a result, the sale of a joint owner-
ship interest rarely realizes the full proportionate value of the jointly owned
asset. In fact, the value of a joint ownership interest is regularly discounted in
tax cases by a factor of twenty-five percent or more below the joint ownership
interest's proportionate share of the value of the whole asset.71 Moreover, after
69. B.M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of
Cannons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. (1993).
70. A.C. FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTrTON (1st Edition 1874 and 2d Edition 1886).
71. See, e.g., Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Haydel v C.I.R., 62
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transfer to a substitute joint owner, the undivided joint ownership arrangement
remains the same, aside from a change in joint owner identity. If the joint own-
ership arrangement was dysfunctional before the transfer, bringing in a new
joint owner rarely solves the underlying problems with the joint ownership
arrangement itself. In such circumstances the only remaining options may be
either to attempt to cooperate or to partition.
After describing some of the typical situations in which partition occurs,
this part will consider some of the types of partition recognized in Texas law.
Both voluntary and compulsory partition are possible in Texas; and each has
several variations. Part IV, which follows, discusses Texas' court-ordered parti-
tion procedures in greater detail.
A. Partition Situations
Reported court decisions rarely reveal the reasons for compulsory partition.
The fact is, any joint owner can force a division of jointly owned property by
bringing a court action to compel partition, without ever having to explain why.
Moreover, when partition is voluntary, partition deeds in county land records do
not reveal the partitioning joint owner's reasons. Potential reasons for partition
appear to be as numerous and varied as Texas mineral, oil and gas interests and
their owners.'
Texas decisional law reflects a variety of circumstances in which joint
owners have sought to partition jointly owned mineral, oil and gas interests. In
some cases, business disagreements have led joint owners to seek to disentangle
undivided ownership by partitioning the jointly owned property. Typical of this
type of partition situation is the extended litigation regarding a hydrocarbon
storage cavern leached out of a salt dome in Liberty County.73 The 126.378-
acre surface estate was owned by MAPCO Underground Storage of Texas, Inc.
(MUST), which also owned an undivided 1/8 of the mineral estate. A 5/8 undi-
vided interest in the mineral estate in 40 acres of the property was owned by
the Carters-Clarence, James Ross and Mrs. Clyde Carter. Texasgulf, Inc. owned
an undivided 2/8 of the mineral estate. After trying to stop MUST's salt leach-
ing operations, the Carters sought partition of the mineral estate. They also
sought recovery for waste and an accounting, although these damage claims
T.CM. (CCIi) 956 (1991). In Re Estate of Ehlers, 911 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Wash. 1996) involved an accounting
with regard to a testamentary trust. The court held that a 25% discounted value was reasonable for land sub-
ject to undivided interests.
72. Possible reasons for partition vary across a wide range. Sometimes a joint owner will partition for
financial reasons, such as to liquidate an investment. Sometimes a joint owner will seek partition when an-
other joint owner appears to be taking unfair advantage of the jointly owned property. Sometimes a partition-
ing joint owner will use partition aggressively to retaliate against or to bully another joint owner for whom
partition is undesirable and costly. Sometimes, joint owners disagree with regard to how jointly owned proper-
ty should be managed. Sometimes joint owners find coordination of their undivided rights unreasonably cum-
bersome and costly. Some joint owners find each other annoying to the point that they simply prefer not to
have to deal with each other any more.
73. See MAPCO, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991), modifying 808 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.
1991, writ granted).
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were severed from the partition action. Eventually, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed a large in personam owelty74 award against MAPCO, Inc., which was
the corporate parent of one of the former joint owners (MUST), but which had
not been made a party to the partition action in the trial court. The acrimonious
relationship among these joint owners is typical of how complex business rela-
tionships can deteriorate and lead to partition.
Another example of this type of partition situation is Hulsey v. Keel,75 in
which the court denied partition. After many years of litigation, one joint owner
sought partition against another joint owner, who owned a 1/16 free-carried
interest in a producing oil and gas lease. Fourteen years after the business dis-
pute arose, the court denied partition, because the court found an implied agree-
ment not to partition based on the nature of the joint venture agreement be-
tween the joint owners.76
Partition of the joint ownership into which failed entities have devolved is
now relatively rare in Texas, perhaps because Texas courts often use resulting
trusts as repositories for a lapsed entity's property. However, in the early twen-
tieth century, there were a number of examples of partition actions brought by
joint owners who had been former partners or shareholders of dissolved entities.
For example, the partition action in Wiess v. McFaddin involved a deadlocked
unincorporated joint-stock association which had dissolved into joint owner-
ship.7 It had become impossible for the association to elect a full board of
trustees necessary to carry on the agricultural business of the association. The
Court of Appeals concluded,
[I]t is patent that it is impossible for this company to continue business
with any chance of success to the shareholders. It is true that a large
amount of property, amounting to perhaps a fortune, is threatened with
damage and depreciation. In our judgement, this threatened damage and
threatened depreciation cannot be remedied. To dissolve the association is
the only just and adequate remedy, and a partition of the property by the
judgment of the court78
In another case, a similar agricultural enterprise, the J. C. Minus Land & Irriga-
tion Company, was dissolved in 1937 when its corporate charter expired. As a
result, the dissolved company's 640 acres of land in Dimmit County became
jointly owned. The court decided that each of the owner-members' shares
should be "set out in the proportion that the amount of stock he owned at disso-
lution bore to the total outstanding capital stock."'79 Later, one of the joint
owners sought partition against J. C. Minus and Mrs. Minus.'
74. Id. at 688. Owelty is an equalizing payment associated with partition in kind, when the physical
shares allotted are not proportionate in value to the respective undivided interests of the joint owners. See dis-
cussion infra notes 222-227.
75. 700 S.W.2d 255 (Trex. App. 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. See discussion at notes 326-27.
77. 211 S.W. 337, 339 (Irex. Civ. App. 1919).
78. Id. at 343.
79. Id. at 222.
80. J.C. Minus also sought an accounting for his expenses and taxes. The Commission of Appeals relied
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On occasion, a joint owner of business property will use partition to gain
strategic advantage over another joint owner. An example of this type of situa-
tion is reflected in the well-known Texas Supreme Court decision in Moseley v.
Hearrell.8" In Moseley, the Texas Supreme Court approved forced partition by
sale of the mineral interests in a one-acre tract of land which was encumbered
with a covenant that no more than one oil well would ever be drilled on the
land.' After a producing well was brought in, Mrs. Lola Hearrell, who owned
an undivided 49/128 interest in the minerals, orally agreed with Wood,
Moseley's predecessor in interest, that she would operate the well during the
time she and Wood were joint owners of the mineral interest in the one acre.
Moseley knew about the oral operating agreement, but sought partition any-
way. 3
Mrs. Hearrell objected to partition on the grounds that it would be inequi-
table. She argued among other things, that Moseley was really trying to acquire
her interest through a partition sale from which she would not receive the full
value of her interest and which would cause her to incur a large federal income
tax liability." The Texas Supreme Court was unmoved. The court noted that
the partition statutes "confer the right to compel partition in the broadest terms"
and emphasized a joint owner's "absolute right to demand segregation of his
interest from that of his co-owner."' The Texas Supreme Court's conclusion
that the potential for unfairness, when one joint owner uses partition to gain
advantage over another, is not relevant to the decision whether to order partition
has undoubtedly fostered a great many strategic partition actions over the past
half century. As will be discussed in Part VI below, this ruling also encouraged
joint owners of mineral, oil and gas interests to enter into no-partition agree-
ments, particularly in the context of joint operating agreements with regard to
oil and gas property.
There are also many situations in which family members, who received
jointly owned property by donative transfer or inheritance, have sought parti-
tion. Donors and testators often give or devise property to groups of relatives,
such as children or grandchildren, who become joint owners of the -property.
These family members may then further divide their undivided interests among
yet another generation of joint owners, and so forth. In addition, because inheri-
tance statutes usually transmit intestate property to groups of heirs according to
various degrees of kinship, intestate succession often fractionates undivided
ownership of inherited property among a number of joint owners.' For exam-
on Hanrick v. Gurley, 54 S.W. 347 (Tex. 1899), in which the Texas Supreme Court had established that in an
equity action for partition, "the court must determine what each is entitled to receive of the estate to be divid-
ed. If charges upon it have been paid by one, of which the others are to receive the benefit, any balance in his
favor over and above his just proportion becomes an equitable charge upon the interests of the others, to be
worked out in the partition." Id. at 355.
81. 171 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1943).
82. Id. at 338.
83. Id. at 337.
84. Id. at 338.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Texas Probate Code § 38 specifies the "Persons Who Take upon Intestacy." Bankston v.
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ple, in the famous partition action Bruni v. Vidaurri,87 there 'were more than
170 different claimants to joint ownership interests, who were "some of the
descendants, and successors in title to descendants of Jose Vasques Borrego"
who was granted 240,000 acres by the Spanish government in 1750.' Sooner
or later, undivided owners, whether family members or not, decide to divide up
their undivided interests. That is when they seek partition.
Joint ownership between former spouses is also a frequent context for
partition, after a property settlement in a divorce action has transformed what
had been joint management community property into joint ownership between
the ex-spouses. For example, in Ware v. Ware89 the Court of Appeals approved
the partition of real estate which had been community property. The divorce
decree ordered that the property be sold at an appraised price, and that one
spouse could remain on the property until it was sold. When the property did
not sell at the appraised price, the non-resident spouse sought partition.' Al-
though relitigation of a property division upon divorce is not allowed under
Baxter v. Ruddle,91 if the former spouses have become joint owners of what
was once community property, partition of the jointly owned property often
occurs.'
When a marriage ends in death rather than in divorce, the deceased
spouse's half of what had been community property becomes a joint ownership
interest which passes by will or inheritance. The other undivided half of the
community property is retained by the surviving spouse.93 When the surviving
spouse dies, his or her undivided half interest independently passes under that
spouse's will or by inheritance to that spouse's heirs. The result is often joint
ownership among two groups of heirs or devisees, who may not know each
other or may not get along. Such a situation typically leads to partition.
Occasionally, partition occurs in connection with bankruptcy. For example,
in In re County Management,94 an unresolved Texas state court action to parti-
tion mineral interests in 113 acres in Lee County complicated a Chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization. After the state court had appointed a receiver to
execute a mineral lease over the entire parcel, a producing well was drilled on
the jointly owned parcel. In dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction, the
Fifth Circuit noted that "The issue will be who will turn over how much" of the
funds from production to the bankruptcy estate.95 On remand, the bankruptcy
court "will be required to take further evidence in order to determine who owns
what percentage of the tract and how much the revenues and expenses of the
Bankston, 206 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947, writ refd).
87. 166 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1942).
88. Id. at 84.
89. 809 S.W.2d 569 (rex. App. 1991).
90. Id. at 571-72.
91. 794 S.W.2d 761 ('rex. 1990).
92. See also Carter v. Charles, 853 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App. 1993).
93. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 37, 45 (West 1980 & Supp. 1998).
94. 788 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 312.
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well have been .... It will certainly apply Texas oil and gas law to the set of
facts it determines... "
Another example of partition arising out of bankruptcy is Thomas v.
McNair,"' in which the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order
partitioning a 5.74-acre property in Bee County. Three men, one of them a
retired oil company employee, went into the bird business. But the three fell
into disagreement. Eventually the younger two of the three joint owners pur-
chased a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the jointly owned prop-
erty and sought to foreclose on it. After the third filed for bankruptcy to prevent
foreclosure, the trial court ordered partition by sale of the jointly owned proper-
ty.98 In Dierschke v. Central National Branch of First National Bank at
Lubbock,' the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a district court order which
enforced an agreement to partition 325 acres of farmland. The farmland had
been jointly owned by two sets of undivided interests. One undivided half was
owned by a husband and wife individually. The other undivided half was
owned by five spendthrift trusts for the couple's five children, with the husband
acting as trustee for each of the five trusts.'" As part of the couple's Chapter
12 bankruptcy reorganization plan, the husband and wife, individually, as well
as the husband as trustee for the children's spendthrift trusts, had entered into
the written agreement to partition the farmland through appraisal and sale.
Eventually, after the husband and wife had defaulted on the Chapter 12 reorga-
nization plan, their undivided half interest was foreclosed and purchased by the
bank. The bank then sought to enforce the bankruptcy-based agreement to parti-
tion the land. The husband claimed that, when he entered into the partition
agreement, he did not have the power, as trustee for the five trusts, to agree to
partition. The court disagreed, and held that enforcing the partition agreement to
sell the land would merely transform the nature of the trust asset from land into
money, without affecting or conveying the five trusts' ownership of an undivid-
ed half of the asset.'O°
In these types of situations, and many more, partition is an often useful
process designed to break up undivided joint ownership interests. As the follow-
ing discussion explains, Texas recognizes several different ways in which joint
owners can partition.
B. Types of Partition
Texas law contemplates several types of partition which may apply to
break up jointly owned oil and gas, and other mineral interests. There are two
sets of variables with regard to these different types of partition: (1) whether
96. Id. at 314.
97. 882 S.W.2d 870 (Tex Civ. App. 1994).
98. Id. at 874-75.
99. 876 S.W.2d 377 (Tex Civ. App. 1994).
100. Id. at 379.
101. Id. at 382.
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partition is accomplished in kind or by sale and (2) whether partition is volun-
tary or compelled by court order. Since both voluntary and court-ordered parti-
tion usually first consider partition in kind, this first section will address parti-
tion methods and the traditional preference for partition in kind, and then ad-
dress partition by sale, which in Texas is the more usual way to partition miner-
al, oil and gas interests. The next two sections will describe first the nature of
voluntary partition and then the nature of compulsory partition. The procedural
complexities of compulsory partition by judicial process are addressed in Part
IV, below.
Texas statutes, courts and lawyers sometimes also use the word "partition"
in contexts other than the division of undivided joint ownership into separately
owned parts. For example, under section 373 of the Texas Probate Code, the
executor or administrator of an estate or the heirs or devisees can request parti-
tion and either full or partial distribution of both real and personal property in
an estate. '  As noted earlier, Texas community property statutes also use par-
tition in yet a different sense, to refer to reallocation of community property
into separate property of one of the spouses through a written agreement.' 3
These and other uses of "partition" are outside the purview of this article,
which focuses on the division of undivided joint ownership interests.
1. Partition Methods: Partition in Kind or Partition by Sale
A preference for partition in kind over partition by sale is a traditional
feature of court-ordered partition.' 4 Initially, partition in kind was the only
way partition could be accomplished. '°5 The Texas partition statute reflects
this traditional approach in directing partition in kind unless it would be inequi-
table to do so."°6 Partition by sale is ordinarily a secondary strategy available
only when partition in kind is demonstrably not feasible. Only if the partition-
ing court has determined that jointly owned property is not capable of division
in kind will partition by sale be ordered. 0 7 However, partition of Texas min-
eral interests or oil and gas lands follows a rather different approach which pre-
sumes that known mineral lands are not generally partitionable in kind because
of uncertainties about the unpredictable distribution of minerals.' 5 Jointly
owned land which is unexplored and undeveloped for minerals is usually parti-
tioned in kind because it is presumed to have an equal distribution of potential
102. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 373 (West 1997).
103. Article 16 § 15 of the Texas Constitution recognizes written partition agreements by spouses regard-
ing transforming community property into separate property interests. Chapter 4, Subchapter B of the Texas
Family Code now deals with marital property agreements. Chapter 9, Subchapter C of the Texas Family Code
provides special procedures for divisions of property after a divorce decree. See discussion of community
property at notes 22-32.
104. Henderson v. Chelsey, 273 S.W. 299, 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925, writ denied), affd 292 S.W. 156
('ex. 1927).
105. 31 Hen. VIII ch. 1 (1539); 32 Hen VIII ch. 32 (1540).
106. TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 761 (West 1997).
107. TEX. R. Ctv. PRO. 770 (West 1997).
108. White v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1948).
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minerals in every part of the property."° Although non-mineral property is
routinely partitioned in kind by dividing up the mineral estate according to lines
drawn on the surface, as in Henderson v. Chelsey, known mineral lands are
usually not partitioned in kind."'
Nevertheless, there are a few cases in which Texas courts have partitioned
known mineral property in kind. In such cases the partitioning court determined
that the minerals were evenly distributed throughout the property, such as when
the joint ownership was of an interest in a very small piece of land. For exam-
ple, in Amereda Petroleum Corp. v. Massad,"' the appellate court approved
partition in kind of jointly owned interests in a lot 50 feet by 150 feet. The
owners of 6/7 of the fee title had leased the mineral rights to one lessee and the
fee owners of the other 1/7 had leased their undivided interest in the minerals to
another mineral lessee."2 Moreover, in MAPCO, Inc. v. Carter"', discussed
above, the Supreme Court of Texas approved a non-statutory equitable partition
action which partitioned a large and complicated mineral property in kind.
2. Partition Strategies: Voluntary or Compulsory
Texas law recognizes several strategies for partitioning jointly owned prop-
erty, including oil and gas and other mineral interests. At the most general
level, Texas recognizes two types of partition strategies: voluntary partition
agreements among joint owners and compulsory partition by court order. Parti-
tion by voluntary agreement among joint owners is possible only when joint
owners are capable of cooperative action. Because such voluntary action has the
advantage of avoiding the time, expense, and sometimes acrimony, which can
accompany compulsory partition through court action. The fact that any joint
owner could bring an action for compulsory judicial partition at any time some-
times motivates voluntary agreements to partition.
In some situations, only one partition strategy is suitable. For example,
compulsory partition will not be available if the joint owners have agreed not to
partition their joint ownership interests." 4 In such circumstances, voluntary
partition is the only way to break up the joint ownership arrangement. On the
other hand, voluntary partition is generally not even considered by a joint own-
er who wants to bring partition offensively against another joint owner to gain
strategic advantage."'
109. See Henderson v. Chelsey, 273 S.W. 299, 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925, writ denied) affd 292 S.W.
156 (Tex. 1927).
110. White, 214 S.W.2d at 973.
111. 239 S.W.2d 730 (rex. Civ. App. 1951, writ ref'd nx.e.)
112. Id. at 734.
113. 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991) modifying 808 S.W.2d 262 (rex. App. 1991, writ granted).
114. See discussion infra noles 285-332.
115. See, eSg., Moseley v. Hearrll, 171 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1943).
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a. Voluntary Partition
As noted earlier, an agreement to partition is often the first course of ac-
tion considered when joint owners mutually decide to break up their undivided
joint ownership interests into separately owned parts. Voluntary partition in
kind is a simple concept. All of the joint owners agree either that each joint
owner will separately own a particular part of the property or that the jointly
owned property will be sold and the proceeds divided proportionately among
the former joint owners. Often voluntary partition by sale is not even viewed as
partition by joint owners who simply decide to sell the jointly owned property
and to divide the proceeds. Voluntary partition is more apparent when joint
owners agree to divide jointly owned property into separately owned parts
through voluntary partition in kind.
Texas is distinctive in enforcing oral partition agreements among partition-
ing joint owners. For over a century, Texas courts have held that the statute of
frauds does not apply to division of joint ownership by partition agreement."'
However, as explained below, written partition agreements have the advantage
of avoiding disputes and uncertainty. With regard to real property, recorded
cross-conveyances, sometimes called partition deeds, may be important to pre-
vent a bona fide purchaser from acquiring an undivided interest in what the
land records would otherwise still show is jointly owned property.
Landgrebe v. Rock Hill Oil Company,"7 illustrates the way voluntary
partition agreements work in Texas. Landgrebe involved a pooled oil and gas
lease of three parcels of land in Goliad County. All three parcels had been
owned by a husband and wife as community property. When the husband died,
his will devised a life estate in his half interest in each of the three parcels to
his wife, along with a power to sell these half interests in the three parcels. The
couple's nine children jointly received the remainder interest in this half of the
three parcels. The surviving wife owned outright the other half of the three par-
cels, in addition to the life estate and power of sale with regard to her deceased
husband's half of the three parcels. She later executed an oil and gas lease of
the three parcels. All of the nine children either joined in or ratified her oil and
gas lease."'
When the wife died, the nine children inherited their mother's half interest
in two of the three parcels as joint owners." 9 Since at their mother's death the
children's joint remainder interests vested in possession with regard to the other
half, the children jointly owned the two parcels. The children then agreed to
partition the two parcels of land, which were surveyed and divided into tracts.
They executed partition deeds which resulted in sole ownership by each child of
various parts of the land. The court held that the partition agreement and deeds
116. See Aycock v. Kimbrough, 12 S.W. 71 (Tex. 1887).
117. 273 S.W.2d 636 ('ex. Civ. App. 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
118. Id. at 637. She also conveyed one of the three parcels to one of the children under her power of
sale.
119. Id. at 638.
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effectively divided the surface estate.'" However, their mother's oil and gas
lease, which predated the partition agreement, remained a pooled community
lease of the interests of all nine children.' As a result, all nine children were
entitled to share proportionately in the royalties from a producing gas well on
one of the tracts."
The terms of a partition agreement are often quite simple. Jointly owned
property is physically divided into specified parts. The joint owners agree that
each of the parts will be held in separate ownership by one of the joint owners.
Usually, the resulting separately owned parts are designed to be proportionate to
the joint owners' fractional joint ownership interests in the undivided whole.
When partition is of real property interests, cross deeds are often exchanged,
and recorded, because a partition agreement alone does not change the title to
the land. In partition deeds, each joint owner conveys to each of the other joint
owners his or her undivided interest in the part of the land allotted to each of
the other partitioning joint owners.'23 In exchange, each joint owner will re-
ceive from all of the other joint owners deeds to their undivided interests in the
parcel which the partition agreement allotted to that particular joint owner.
Usually partition deeds are general warranty deeds so that if the title to one of
the partitioned parts fails, all of the joint owners will share proportionately in
any loss.' 24 Partition deeds may also disclaim owelty so that the title to the
partitioned parts will be clear of potential owelty liens.
One noteworthy feature of voluntary partition agreements in Texas is that
they have been held to work an ouster of an excluded joint owner for the pur-
poses of adverse possession. The exclusion of a joint owner from a partition
agreement effectively repudiates, or ousts, that joint owner's claim to joint
ownership. This excluded or repudiated share is then susceptible to adverse
possession by those who occupy the partitioned parts of the property for the
period required by the statute of limitation." s In Republic Production Co. v.
Lee, the Commission of Appeals ruled that when one joint owner was excluded
from a partition agreement which allocated all of the jointly owned property
among the partitioning joint owners, "such act of partition, when followed by
adverse possession, even if wholly void as against the excluded cotenant, con-
stitutes a complete and unequivocal repudiation of the cotenancy relation-
ship.' '1
The Republic Production case involved a 1/10 interest in some land in
120. Id. at 639.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 640.
123. Cf. Houston Oil Co. v. Kirkindall, 145 S.W.2d 1074 (Crex. 1941) (regarding a defective partition
agreement held not to constitute a conveyance). Cf. 57 TEX. JUR. 3d, Partition § 6 (1996).
124. However, the doctrine of after-acquired title, also known as estoppel by deed, or the Duhig Rule,
does not apply to partition agreements (Zapatero v. Canales, 730 S.W.2d 111, 116-17 ('rex. App. 1987, writ
ref'd nmr.e.)) or to partition deeds (Hamilton v. Hamilton, 280 S.W.2d 588, 593-94 (rex. 1955)). See Duhig v.
Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Crex. 1940).
125. Republic Production Co. v. Lee, 121 S.W.2d 973 ('ex. Comm'n App. 1938).
126. Id. at 977, citing Honea v. Arledge, 120 S.W. 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ refd), with regard to
"the effect of a partition, so far as an ouster is concerned".
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Rusk County. 27 A 1/5 interest had been owned by Claudia, one of five chil-
dren who inherited joint ownership interests from their father. Claudia married
and moved to Utah. When she died intestate, her surviving husband received
half of her 1/5 interest (the 1/10 interest at issue in the case). Several years
later, the jointly owned land in Texas was partitioned among Claudia's rela-
tives, who took no account of any possible interest Claudia may have had,
much less the 1/10 interest inherited by Claudia's husband. After petroleum was
discovered in the area, Claudia's husband asserted his undivided 1/10 joint
ownership interest. 2' But he was too late; adverse possession initiated by the
ouster embodied in the partition agreement had already vested title in Claudia's
Texas kin who had been occupying the partitioned tracts."
Sometimes, the "equitable partition doctrine" is misconstrued as affording
yet another type of voluntary partition. However, the equitable partition doctrine
does not refer to a form of partition, but rather to a remedial doctrine which can
arise when one joint owner unilaterally has purported to sell full ownership of a
specific part of jointly owned land."3 Such a unilateral conveyance by a joint
owner does not partition, or otherwise affect, the undivided joint ownership
arrangement. One joint owner, acting alone, can only convey her undivided
joint ownership interest.'' As will be discussed more fully below, the equita-
ble partition doctrine'32 may be applied later, if the property is partitioned in
kind by court order.
It is important to bear in mind that, for all of the practical advantages of
voluntary partition, it requires unanimous consent by all of the joint owners.
Particularly with regard to highly fractionated mineral, oil and gas interests,
which may be held by dozens or hundreds of joint owners, unanimous agree-
ment can be very difficult to secure. Moreover, the strategic bargaining position
of the last of the joint owners whose agreement is needed for a voluntary parti-
tion can make voluntary partition more of a theoretical possibility than a real
opportunity.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 976.
129. See id. at 979.
130. See discussion in text infra notes 228-34.
131. See Larrison v. Walker, 149 S.W.2d 172, 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941, writ ref'd.)
132. A partitioning court may exercise its equitable powers to protect the expectations of a purchaser from
one of the joint owners by allocating to the purchaser the specific part of the jointly owned property which
one of the joint owners had earlier conveyed to that purchaser. Theoretically, in the subsequent partition ac-
tion, the partitioning court allocates the portion of the land, which the joint owner had conveyed to the pur-
chaser, to the former joint owner, who had earlier unilaterally conveyed it. Then, based on estoppel by deed,
the allocated portion automatically inures to the benefit of the purchaser. The doctrine of equitable partition is
the basis for a partitioning trial court to equitably allocate that specific part directly to the purchaser. Among
the oil and gas and mineral decisions which have discussed the concept of equitable partition are White v.
Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1948) and Barfield v. Holland, 844 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App. 1992, writ denied),
both of which declined to follow the doctrine under the circumstances of these cases. See discussion infra
notes 229-34.
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 33 Tulsa L.J. 729 1997-1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
b. Compulsory Partition
In Texas, as in other United States jurisdictions, any joint owner of a pos-
sessory interest has the right to break up her undivided joint ownership arrange-
ment through involuntary partition by court action. 133 It is unnecessary for the
plaintiff in a partition action to have attempted to voluntarily partition by agree-
ment among the joint owners before filing for court-ordered partition. Any joint
owner of a possessory interest is absolutely entitled to a court decree separating
that joint owner's interest from the interests of the other joint owners.' Em-
phasizing the individualism and free enterprise long associated with doing busi-
ness in Texas, the Court of Civil Appeals in Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein Build-
ing Corp. explained some of the reasons why Texas courts welcome compulso-
ry partition actions: "Partition is a right much favored by the courts upon the
ground that it not only secures peace, but promotes industry and enterprise; that
each should have his own. The mere difficulty of effecting it is not regarded as
a sufficient reason for refusing to grant it.'
135
The right to compulsory partition is a very old incident of joint ownership,
dating back to the second Statute of Westminster in 1272.'3 When Texas
adopted its first partition legislation in 1851, the statute recognized that the
equitable powers Texas courts would also continue to provide an alternative
partition process."3 At present, the right to partition both real and personal
property is reflected in Texas Property Code § 23.001: "A joint owner or claim-
ant of real property or an interest in real property or a joint owner of personal
property may compel a partition of the interest or the property among the joint
owners or claimants under this chapter and the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.' '
Texas Property Code § 23.002 provides in subsection (a) that "A joint
owner or a claimant of real property or an interest in real property may bring an
action to partition the property or interest in a district court of a county in
which any part of the property is located." The following subsection (b) man-
dates that "A joint owner of personal property must bring an action to partition
the property in a court that has jurisdiction over the value of the property. ''31
As a result, unless there is an agreement among joint owners that they will not
partition jointly owned property, compulsory partition is always available to
break up possessory joint ownership into individually owned parts.
However, the right to compulsory partition does not apply to all types of
jointly owned mineral, oil and gas interests. The Court of Appeals in
133. See Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337 (rex. 1943).
134. See Dierschke v. Central National Branch of First National Bank at Lubbock, 876 S.W.2d 377, 379-
80 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1994).
135. 442 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
136. FREEMAN, supra note 70, at 496.
137. Acts Dec. 24, 1851 at 20.
138. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.001 (West 1995). See also TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 756 et. seq. (West
1997).
139. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.002(a) (West 1995).
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Lichtenstein insisted that compulsory partition is only available with regard to
jointly owned possessory interests." It does not apply to all of the varied
types of jointly owned nonpossessory mineral, oil and gas interests, although
these nonpossessory interests are sometimes described as having been parti-
tioned by voluntary agreement. 4' With regard to mineral, oil and gas interests,
the exclusion of nonpossessory interests makes compulsory partition available
only with regard to undivided joint ownership of the full fee simple, the mineral
estate and the mineral lease, which in Texas conveys a possessory interest in
the minerals. Only when undivided ownership also involves joint possession of
the same interest in land will compulsory partition apply."
In complicated arrangements involving multiple types and levels of miner-
al, oil and gas interests, this limitation to possessory interests means that undi-
vided joint ownership of a mineral lease can be partitioned; but jointly owned
royalty interests associated with that lease will not be partitioned by court ac-
tion. 43 If the mineral estate is jointly owned, it is partitionable among the
mineral estate's joint owners. For example, in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Ostrom, the Court of Appeals held that mineral estate lessors and the owners of
royalty interests in the same lease were not joint owners of the same possessory
interest and therefore were not entitled to compulsory partition of their two
different types of interests.'"
The Court of Appeals in Gilbreath v. Douglas,"5 explained that only
joint owners who share undivided possession are entitled to bring partition
against each other. The court noted that owners of nonpossessory interests, or of
different types of interests, are not entitled to partition. Because a mineral lessee
holds a different type of right from that of the owner of a royalty based on the
same lease, these interests are not entitled to compulsory partition. The
Gilbreath court insisted, "Necessary requisites to a partition, be it an estate in
land or minerals, are that the partitioners must be joint owners of the interests
sought to be partitioned and the party or parties seeking the partition must have
an equal right to possession with the other joint owners.""'6
In Gilbreath, partition in kind of the oil, gas or other minerals in a quarter
section of land in Wheeler County was limited in time as well as space. The
partition was limited to "The SE 1/4 of Section 58 to a subsurface depth of
2512 feet [which] is the largest unit in which the cotenancy of all parties hereto
exists in common .... That horizontal area contained a cotenancy of all parties
140. 442 S.W.2d 765,767-68 (Trex. Civ. App. 1969).
141. See Lane v. Hughes, 228 S.W.2d 986 (rex. Civ. App. 1950). Texas court decisions which describe
an owner of a royalty interest as having voluntarily "partitioned" a royalty appear to refer to a joint owner
having subdivided a jointly owned royalty interest by conveying part of that fractional royalty to others. For
example, in Winslow v. Acker, 781 S.W.2d 322 (rex. App. 1989, writ denied) a unilateral transfer of a frac-
tional portion of a fractional royalty was described as a partition of a royalty.
142. See Lane, 288 S.W.2d at 988.
143. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App. 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. Id. at 234.
145. 388 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965, writ ref'd nx e.)
146. Id. at 218.
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hereto and such interests were in common to that depth only."'47 The Court
also limited the duration of the partition to "a period of two years from July 8,
1963, 'and for so long thereafter as oil, gas, condensate, and distillate or other
gaseous substance is produced in paying quantities from any well situated there-
on. '" 1 48 The Court of Appeal explained that "This limitation was based on a
Pooling and Unitization Agreement which pooled certain appellee's mineral in-
terests in and under" the partitioned quarter section.49
The opinion in Gilbreath exemplifies Texas courts' typically pragmatic
approach to determining the nature and extent of partitionable mineral, oil and
gas interests:
Assuming the court had not limited the partition as to time, the pooling
agreement itself places a limitation upon the mineral estate held thereun-
der according to its own terms. A partition in kind can not operate as a
conveyance but is simply a distribution of interests in land between per-
sons who are part owners. Arnold v. Cauble, 49 Tex. 527. A partition in
perpetuity under the facts and circumstances of this case would be con-
trary to the expressed limitation placed on some of the [parties'] mineral
estate. , ,1
5
Partitioning the largest possible property in which joint owners held coextensive
undivided possessory rights, in terms of time and of space and of interest was
appropriate. This practical strategy is typical of the way in which Texas courts
partition possessory joint ownership interests in oil and gas and other minerals.
IV. COMPULSORY PARTITION PROCESSES IN TEXAS
Within Texas' blended system of law and equity, there are several different
processes through which Texas courts may carry out forced partition of jointly
owned possessory mineral, oil and gas interests. In addition to the partition
procedures which apply to possessory real property interests in minerals, oil and
gas, ' there are also procedures for partitioning jointly owned personal prop-
erty, such as drilling equipment, pipe and other equipment.'52 Under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, federal courts will also follow these Texas proce-
dures when partitioning jointly owned oil and gas facilities located in Texas
offshore areas. 53
147. Id. at 282.
148. See id. at 281.
149. Id.
150. .Id.
151. TEX. PROPERTY CODE ANN. §23.001 (West 1995); TEX. R. Civ. PRO. 756-771 (West 1997). The
original partition statute in Texas was enacted in 1851 (Act Dec. 24, 1851, at 20). During the early decades of
the twentieth century, mineral interests were specifically included in the statute as partitionable property.
152. TEx. R. Civ. PRO. 772-775 (West 1997).
153. See EP Operating Limited Partnership v. Placid Oil Co., 26 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
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A. Personal Property
Compulsory partition of personal property related to mineral, oil or gas
production is governed by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 773-775 which direct
that such partition will normally be in kind, unless the "personal property will
not admit of a fair and equitable partition."'5 4 In the latter circumstance, the
personal property can be sold under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 775 and the
proceeds distributed among the former joint owners. The statutory partition
procedure which applies to personal property 5' is considerably simpler than
the statutory process which applies to partition of real property. There may be a
jury trial to determine the value of each article of personal property.' 6 How-
ever, partitioning personal property does not require the complex, multi-phased
process which applies to statutory partition of real property in kind. In practice,
equipment associated with real property, such as mineral, oil or gas production
equipment, is frequently partitioned through the same partition method (in kind
or by sale) as that used for the jointly owned real property with which it is
associated.
B. Real Property
Texas' distinctive blend of law and equity jurisdiction is reflected in the
two different procedures available for compulsory partition of Texas real prop-
erty: equitable partition and statutory partition. 7 Texas' statutory partition
process closely resembles the cumbersome English common law action which
dates back to the thirteenth century.' Equitable partition of joint ownership
without going through the statutory process is usually somewhat simpler. More-
over, because Texas trial court jurisdiction includes blended equity powers,
partition proceedings which fail to satisfy statutory requirements may neverthe-
less validly partition jointly owned property. 9
1. Equitable Action to Partition
In Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Development Company the Su-
preme Court of Texas explained the origins of equitable partition:
At a very early date [in England] courts of equity assumed jurisdiction in
cases of partition, and even after partition at common law was extended
by statute to joint tenancies and tenancies in common, the remedy in the
law courts was still so narrow and imperfect that the jurisdiction of equity
in partition soon became almost exclusive.... In this state partition by
suit, whether brought under the statute or without the aid of the statute,
154. TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 775 (West 1997).
155. TE X. PROPERTY CODE ANN. § 23.001 (West 1995); TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 772 -775 (West 1997).
156. TEX. R. Civ. PRO. 773 (West 1997).
157. See TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 756 et seq. (West 1997).
158. See FREEMAN, supra note 70, at 496-511.
159. See Pool v. Lamon, 28 S.W. 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
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does not proceed independently of the rules of equity.'6
Non-statutory equitable partition actions have been a frequent context in which
the Texas Supreme Court has insisted on limiting the equitable powers of Texas
trial courts. One of the oldest of these cases is Arnold v. Cauble,"6' in which
the Texas Supreme Court reversed a trial court's order partitioning a farm. The
farm had been community property until the death of the husband. When the
husband died, his heirs inherited his half interest in the farm, with the other half
interest remaining in his widow. Apparently believing that she owned all of the
farm, the widow sold the south half of the farm to a first grantee and, later,
sold the north half to a second grantee. The trial court partitioned the north half
to the heirs of the deceased husband and then exercised the court's equitable
powers to move the second grantee down to the south half to share equally with
the widow's first grantee. Ruling that this Solomonic solution exceeded the
equitable powers of the trial court, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and held
that the trial court's equity powers did not reach so far."
The Texas Supreme Court's ruling in Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement
& Dev. Co., noted above, is a somewhat more modem instance of the con-
straints placed on equitable relief in compulsory partition actions.' 3 In Thom-
as, the equitable partition action involved a 3/35 interest in several thousand
acres in Hardin County. This 3/35 interest had been retained by three of seven
heirs of a man named Duck who had owned an undivided 1/5 interest in the
land. The Houston Oil Company mistakenly thought it had purchased all of the
joint ownership interests held by all of the heirs of Duck from a man named
Vincent, who purported to act as attorney in fact for all seven of the heirs of
Duck. Unfortunately for Houston Oil, Vincent had no power of attorney from
three of the seven Duck heirs.' However, believing that it owned all of the
Duck interests, Houston Oil purported to convey the surface to Southwestern
Settlement, and retained what Houston Oil thought was the whole severed min-
eral estate. Later, Houston Oil conveyed an undivided one-half interest in its re-
tained minerals to the Republic Production Company.'o The Texas Supreme
Court ruled that, even exercising broad equitable jurisdiction, the trial court
could not validate the severance of the whole mineral estate from the whole
surface estate, because Houston Oil never received title to the 3/35 interest in
both surface and unsevered minerals held by the three Duck heirs." The
160. 123 S.W.2d 290, 296 ('rex. 1939).
161. 49 Tex. 527 (1878).
162. This venerable Texas case brings to mind Mark Twain's story about Slide Mountain, one of the
chapters in Mark Twain's RoUGHING IT (1870) (H. Smith and E. Branch, eds. 1993 edition) at 221-227. This
is "the great land-slide case of Hyde vs. Morgan," Id. at 220, which Mark Twain spins into an amusing yam
about two miners in Nevada territory. A landslide sent one miner's property down the mountainside where it
came to rest on top of the property of another miner. The court ruled that there was no liability because it was
an act of God, but noted that perhaps the two properties could continue to co-exist, one on top of the other.
163. 123 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1939).
164. Id. at 292.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 300.
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holders of these unpartitioned joint ownership interests had not authorized any
conveyance, much less severance, of their undivided interests in the full fee.
Their joint ownership interests remained just as undivided and unsevered as
when they were inherited from Duck. The 3/35 interests could be partitioned.
However, any partition action would result in these interests owning, either in
kind or in money value, 3/35 of the full fee simple absolute, including both the
surface and the unsevered mineral estate.
Among the most interesting recent examples of an equitable partition ac-
tion brought outside of the Texas partition statute, is MAPCO, Inc. v. Cart-
er."'7 As previously discussed, the MAPCO, Inc. partition case involved a hy-
drocarbon storage cavern which had been leached into a salt dome by one joint
owner, without the consent of the other joint owners. 68 The last of the pub-
lished opinions from the Court of Appeals emphasized the equity powers of the
trial court in an equitable partition action brought under the general equity
jurisdiction of Texas district courts:
A partition suit has been declared an equitable proceeding with appropri-
ate relief reposing in the clear, clean conscience of the chancellor sitting
in equity. One of the proudest boasts of Texas law and jurisprudence is
that our District Courts sit as both judges at law and chancellors in equity
in a perfectly blended system of law and equity. The trial court was well
within its prerogatives and powers to apply the rules of equity when it ad-justed the respective rights, duties and obligations between the parties.
Indeed, the chancellor had a duty to do so. Historically, the king's chan-
cellor was to keep the king's conscience clear and to see to it that justice
was done and that right dealing and fair dealing existed between and
amongst the parties. Historically and traditionally, the equity side of the
court acts in personam. Historically, the chancellor in England was a high,
important churchman.
69
The Texas Supreme Court reversed one part of the Court of Appeals ruling
which approved an award of "equitable owelty" amounting to $450,000 against
the parent corporation of the joint owner which leached the cavern in the salt
dome. 7 This reversal was based on the fact that the parent corporation had
not been a party to the partition action. Since the parties did not contest the
equitable partition itself, the Supreme Court of Texas did not disturb other parts
of the Court of Appeals decision.'7 It is noteworthy that the Texas Supreme
Court's ruling in MAPCO, Inc., was similar to the court's ruling in Thomas"
a half century earlier, and was also like the decision in Arnold' in the centu-
ry before. In all of these decisions, the Supreme Court of Texas recognized the
legitimacy of non-statutory equitable partition. But, at the same time, the Texas
167. 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991), affg in part 808 S.W.2d 262 (rex. App. 1991, writ granted). See
discussion supra at note 73.
168. 808 S.W.2d 262, 266-67.
169. Id. at 269 (rex. App. 1991, writ granted), affd in part, 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991).
170. 817 S.W.2d 686 (rex. 1991).
171. Id. at 687.
172. 123 S.W.2d 290 (rex. 1939).
173. 49 Tex. 527 (1878).
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Supreme Court insisted on limits to the equitable powers of Texas trial courts in
equitable partition actions. As the Texas Supreme Court noted in MAPCO, Inc.,
usual rules of civil procedure, including jurisdiction over the parties whose
property is affected by the partitioning court's equitable decision, continue to
constrain the expansiveness and creativity of equitable partition actions.7 1
2. Statutory Partition Actions
The statutory partition process in Texas is much more structured, although
the equitable background of all partition actions remains under the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure which relate to partition: "The rules of equity.., shall
govern in proceedings for partition in all respects not provided for by law or
these rules."'75 With regard to real property, the Texas statutory partition pro-
cess, under §§ 23.001 through 23.005 of the Texas Property Code and Rules
756 through 778 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, establishes a three-
phase partition procedure, two phases of which result in separate appealable
judgments, if partition in kind is ordered."6
In the three-phase partition process which applies to possessory real prop-
erty interests, the initial phase of a partition action used to be described as
interlocutory." However, this phase of partition results in a final judgment
which is conclusive, unless reversed on appeal, with regard such matters as
partitionability, the fractional interests of the parties, and whether the property
is to be partitioned in kind or by sale.' 78 If partition is to be in kind, the first
phase also determines who the commissioners are to be and what instructions
the commissioners are to follow in dividing up the real property, including
whether the "equitable partition doctrine" should be applied to allocate a specif-
ic portion to an earlier purchaser from one of the joint owners.
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 760 the court determines the frac-
tional "share or interest of each of the joint owners or claimants in the real
estate sought to be divided and all questions of law or equity affecting the title
to the land which may arise." Under Rule 761, the partitioning court is directed
to "determine before entering the [initial] decree of partition whether the prop-
erty or any part thereof, is susceptible of partition," which in this context also
means whether the property is susceptible to partition in kind. Under Rule 770,
if the court determines that the property is not partitionable in kind, the court
will order partition by sale.179 If the land is partitionable in kind, under Rule
761 the court appoints three or more commissioners to work out the physical
division of the property and instructs the commissioners with regard to the
174. 817 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (Tex. 1991).
175. TEX. R. CIV. PRo. 776 (West 1967 & Supp. 1997).
176. See Griffin v. Wolfe, 610 S.W.2d 466 (rex. 1980); Thomas v. McNair, 882 S.W.2d 870, 876 (Tex.
App. 1994, no writ).
177. See 57 TEX. JUR. 3d, Partition § 50 (1996). Cf. Redden v. Hickey, 308 S.W.2d 225, 229 (rex. App.
1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
178. TEx. R. CIV. PRo. 761 (West 1967 & Supp. 1997).
179. TIEx. R. CIv. PRo. 770. See 57 TEX. JUR. 3d, Partition § 61 (1996).
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proportion to be set apart to each joint owner, as well as equitable consider-
ations, such as improvements made by one of the joint owners."
Rules 758 and 759 provide for citation by publication with regard to a
joint ownership interest in real property held by an unknown person or by a
person whose residence is unknown. If a jury trial is demanded, the jury deter-
mines all factual issues."' At this stage, the court provides instructions to the
commissioners regarding such issues as application of the doctrine of equitable
partition" and other equitable considerations such as improvements. At the
conclusion of this first phase of statutory partition, the court enters an initial
partition decree which is subject to immediate appeal. 83
The second phase of the statutory partition process applicable to jointly
owned real property involves the work of commissioners, described in Rule 761
as "three or more competent and disinterested persons,"'' who implement the
initial partition decree by physically dividing up the jointly owned property into
the fractional parts determined by the court in its initial partition decree. Under
Rule 766, "The commissioners, or a majority of them, shall proceed to partition
the real estate described in the [initial partition] decree of the court, in accor-
dance with the directions contained in such decree and with the provisions of
law and these rules."'' The property may be surveyed by order of the court
under Rule 764.
In Yturria v. Kimbro, the Court of Appeals explained the unique role of
commissioners in Texas partition actions:
Although the commissioners exercise no judicial authority, neither do they
exercise a purely ministerial duty without the exercise of some indepen-
dent discretion on their part. A given quantity of real property to be parti-
tioned is not generally a fungible mass, but may contain within its borders
very different terrains, frontages, or other characteristics more or less
valuable. Matters of valuation concerning the property itself and objective
considerations concerning the best manner of dividing the property in
accordance with the instructions given while retaining the highest value
for the partitioned tracts, are entrusted to the commissioners and not thejudge or jury."
The appointment and work of the commissioners in partition actions echo the
thirteenth century English practice of appointing four or five persons as justices
of the peace for the purpose of dividing up land inherited by coparceners.8 7
The third phase of the statutory partition process accepts or rejects the
report of the commissioners. Under Rule 771, if the commissioners' division
into separately owned parts appears to have unjustly diminished the value of the
180. See Sayers v. Pyland, 161 S.W.2d 769 (Tex 1942).
181. See Azios v. Slot, 653 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App. 1983).
182. See discussion infra notes 228-234.
183. TEx. R. Civ. PRo. § 761 (vest 1967 & Supp. 1997). See 57 TEX. JUR..3d, Partition § 50 (1996).
184. TEX. 1 Civ. Po. 761 (West 1967 & Supp. 1997).
185. TEX. R CIv. PRo. 766 (West 1967 & Supp. 1997).
186. 921 S.W.2d 338, 343 ('ex. App. 1996).
187. See FREEMAN, supra note 70, at 496-97.
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property or if the partition results in shares not equal to the joint ownership
interests determined by the court in its instructions, the report can be chal-
lenged. Rule 771 directs that "[i]f the report be found to be erroneous in any
material respect, or unequal and unjust, the same shall be rejected, and other
commissioners shall be appointed by the Court, and the same proceedings had
as in the first instance."'" This evaluation of the physical division, followed
by acceptance or rejection of the commissioners' report, is subject to a second
jury trial and results in a second appealable trial court decision, the final parti-
tion decree. 9'
With regard to mineral, oil and gas interests, the famous Texas Court of
Appeals decision in Henderson v. Chesley, ruled that, in the first phase of parti-
tion, if "there has been no development or exploration of minerals of any kind,
in, on, or under the land in question, we think that the court should assume for
the purpose of partition that each acre of the land contains an equal amount of
minerals and partition by dividing the surface."" The court affirmed the trial
court's initial (first-phase) partition decree and endorsed "[t]he assumption that
each acre contains an equal amount of undeveloped minerals.'... The three
commissioners had already been appointed, and were to go out and allot the
mineral rights to the former joint owners in the famous "checkerboard" pattern
of partition associated with Henderson v. Chesley, based on the assumption that
each acre contains an equal amount of undeveloped minerals.
Later, in White v. Smyth, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the jury had
properly 'found a jointly owned rock asphalt mineral estate to be not
partitionable in kind, because it was known mineral land: "[Tihe trial court
correctly directed its sale and the distribution of the proceeds instead of under-
taking to divide it by lines drawn on the surface. There is no reason for assum-
ing, as was done in the Henderson-Chesley case, where there was no evidence
as to the existence of minerals, that each acre of the land contains an equal
amount of minerals."'" One of the joint owners, White, had earlier developed
an extensive rock asphalt pit mine on one part of the property under a mineral
lease. After surrendering his lease, White, who by then had acquired 1/9 of the
mineral estate, physically removed his 1/9 share of the rock asphalt. He mined,
processed and sold rock asphalt in an amount which White claimed was equiva-
lent to his 1/9 share. Then he brought a partition action, in which he sought to
have the mineral estate partitioned in kind. He wanted the area from which he
had taken what he claimed was his 1/9 of the rock asphalt to be allocated to
him, either under the theory that he was the "improver" of that portion or under
an extension of the doctrine of equitable partition.
However, in the first phase of the partition process, the jury determined
188. TEx. R. Civ. PRo. 771.
189. See Word v. Druthett, 44 Tex. 365 (Tex. 1875); 57 TEX. JUR. 3d, Partition § 60 (1996).
190. 273 S.W. 299, 303 (rex. Civ. App. 1925 writ denied).
191. Id.
192. 214 S.W.2d 967, 974 (rex. 1948).
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that the rock asphalt mineral estate could not be partitioned in kind because of
the variable nature of rock asphalt deposits. The court then ordered the min-
eral estate sold and the proceeds divided among the joint owners. In connection
with the partition, the jury also found White liable to account to the other joint
owners for their proportionate interests in the jointly owned rock asphalt which
he had mined, processed and sold, after surrendering his lease. The Texas Su-
preme Court let stand the district court's first-phase partition decree, which
ordered that the jointly owned property be sold.'94 In addition the decree re-
quired White to account to his joint owners for $22,382.72, plus interest, which
was the value of 8/9 of the net profits White had realized from mining, pro-
cessing and selling the 397,381.11 tons of rock asphalt which White had re-
moved after he had surrendered his mineral lease.' The jury's determination
in the first phase of the partition process that partition in kind was not feasible
made validation of White's unilateral removal of 1/9 of the rock asphalt impos-
sible and his liability to account to the other joint owners, for all practical pur-
poses, inevitable.
Texas courts are generally quite strict in requiring compulsory partition
actions to be brought in the county where the land is located, particularly when
real property titles may be affected by a partition action.'" For example, in
Goolsby v. Bond,97 a bankruptcy trustee brought suit in Hunt County to parti-
tion land in Andrews County. The Texas Supreme Court held the bankruptcy
trustee's partition action was improper because it was brought in the wrong
county.' The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 15011 (1997) cur-
rently requires that "Actions... for partition of real property ... shall be
brought in the county in which all or a part of the property is located."' 99
Although compulsory partition is always at least partly equitable, the "invi-
olate" right to a trial by jury, guaranteed in Texas Constitution article I, § 15
and article V, § 10, applies to Texas partition actions.' For example, in Azios
v. Slot,"' the Court of Appeal insisted that a factual dispute regarding whether
jointly owned land was or was not partitionable in kind should have been tried
before a jury, when a timely request for jury trial had been made under Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 216. In Yturria v. Kimbro,2 2 the Court of Appeal fol-
lowed Azios in holding that the right to a jury trial applies to determinations
regarding equitable considerations, such as improvements. In Yturria one of
three joint owners of several tracts of land constructed improvements on land
193. Id. at 969.
194. Id. at 974.
195. Id. at 969.
196. See Pena v. Sling, 140 S.W.2d 441 (rex. 1940); 142 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
197. 163 S.W.2d 830,(Tex. 1942).
198. Id. at 832.
199. TEx. Crv. PRAC. & REM. § 15.011 (West 1997).
200. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15&art. V,§ 10.
201. 653 S.W.2d 111 (rex. App. 1983).
202. 921 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App. 1996).
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which became jointly owned after the termination of a trust.203 The Yturria
court ruled that such matters as property valuation and division of the tracts are,
by statute, issues for the commissioners to determine, and not findings of fact
susceptible to determination by a jury.a However, factual findings with re-
gard to the accuracy and fairness of the commissioners' report are subject to a
jury trial in the third phase of Texas' three-phase statutory partition proce-
dure.2"e In some partition cases, there are two jury trials. The first jury trial
considers the partitionability in kind of the jointly owned property and the joint
owners' respective interests in it. Then, if partition is ordered in kind, there may
be a second jury trial with regard to the allotments made by the commissioners
to the partitioning joint owners.
Texas' three-phase process of partition, potentially involving two jury trials
and two separate appeals, can make partition of possessory mineral, oil and gas
interests a lengthy and technical process. Even in an equitable proceeding for
partition, without the appointment of commissioners, the compulsory partition
process can be time-consuming and expensive. For example, in MAPCO, Inc. v.
Cartei'- an equitable partition action discussed above, the partition action be-
gan in 1986 and did not conclude until after two Court of Appeals' rulings and
the Texas Supreme Court's final remand in 1991. Since Texas has a quite mod-
em single form of common law joint ownership, it is surprising to find Texas
courts following such an old-fashioned and cumbersome procedure for partition
in kind.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF PARTION
Although the main objective of both voluntary and compulsory partition is
to divide up undivided possessory rights, partition can also have a number of
other practical and legal consequences. With regard to partitioning mineral, oil
and gas interests, the most important of these consequences are related to title
and taxes. In addition, partition can also have other, title-related, consequences,
such as ouster, owelty and accounting. The nature of these consequences in any
particular case will depend on a number of factors, such as whether partition is
in kind or by sale,207 and whether the jointly owned property is real or person-
al property.
When partition is voluntary, all joint owners agree either to divide up
jointly owned property and to allocate particular parts to each of the former
joint owners or to sell the jointly owned property and to divide the pro-
ceeds.08 To a considerable extent, joint owners who agree to partition can
203. Id. at 340.
204. Id. at 343.
205. Id. at 344.
206. 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991).
207. As noted earlier, there is a presumption that all types of jointly owned property will be partitioned in
kind. Partition by forced sale is allowed by statute, but limited to circumstances where partition in kind is not
equitable or feasible, as is considered the case with regard to jointly owned mineral, oil or gas properties.
208. See text supra at notes 116-132; 57 TEX. JUR. 3d, Partition §§ 6, 8-15. As noted supra note 124,
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control many of the consequences of partition through the provisions of their
partition agreement. However, once a partition agreement has been acted upon,
for example by executing cross-deeds, it is generally not possible to rescind or
to change the partition, even if the agreed partition has generated unforeseen re-
sults or was based on mistaken assumptions or even fraud.2°
In Goldring v. Goldring,1 ° the Court of Appeals rejected a suit by four
children against their father, Phidias. The children sought cancellation of parti-
tion deeds and rescission of a partition agreement on the grounds of fraud per-
petrated by their father. The partition agreement and subsequent conveyances
divided a farm which had been owned by Emma Goldring, the plaintiffs' grand-
mother and the defendant's mother. The voluntary partition agreement had
allotted large parts of the farm to Phidias?" Emma Goldring's somewhat am-
biguous will was later interpreted to have bequeathed the farm to the four chil-
dren, and not to have bequeathed to Phidias any interest in the farm, other than
the role of serving as trustee for the four children during his life.2 2 The Court
of Appeals rejected the children's effort, more than a decade after they had
agreed to the partition, to set aside the voluntary partition.21 3 Finding that
there was valid consideration recited in the several cross-deeds and agreements
involved in the case, the court was unwilling to unravel the agreed partition,
even when the assumptions regarding the joint ownership interests underlying
the partition agreement had turned out to have been unfounded.2 4 When joint
owners agree to break up undivided ownership through voluntary partition, the
allocation of the parts of the property has permanent consequences.
A. Title Consequences of Partition in Kind
Partition in kind disentangles joint owners' undivided rights to possession
of a whole property into individually owned separate parts. But partition in
itself does not directly affect the land title. The Texas Property Code states that,
"Except as provided by this chapter, a partition of real property does not affect
a right in the property."2 5 In Hammill & Smith v. Ogden, the Court of Civil
Appeals insisted with regard to a voluntary partition in kind that "[i]t is the
established law in this state that a deed of partition does not convey title to the
property involved, but merely partitions possession and dissolves tenancy in
Texas does not apply the Duhig Rule based on an estoppel by deed to partition agreements and partition
deeds. Zapatero v. Canales, 730 S.W.2d 111, 116-117 ('ex. App. 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hamilton v. Hamil-
ton, 280 S.W.2d 588, 593-94 (rex. 1955). See Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.
1940).
209. Cf. Rodkey v. Rees, 527 P.2d 1150 (Okia. Ct. App. 1974) (One of the joint owners was a trustee
without power of sale.); Strait v. Fuller, 334 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1959); Marla E. Mansfield, A Tale of Two Own-
ers: Real Property Co-Ownership and Mineral Development, 43 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 20.08[2]
(1997).
210. 523 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
211. Id. at 752.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 761.
214. Id. at 760.
215. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.004(c) (West 1995).
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 33 Tulsa L.J. 741 1997-1998
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
common."2 6 With regard to compulsory partition, the Court of Civil Appeals
in Bankston v. Bankston emphatically stated that "In a partition suit it is never
the intention of a Court to render a judgment which affects-that is, which
changes-the title of the parties. The intention of the Court in such a case is
always merely to segregate the undivided interests of the parties according to
their share, leaving the title unaffected."217 After partition, the same "condi-
tions and covenants that applied to the property prior to the partition" remain
applicable to each part allotted to a former joint owner."'
Moreover, Texas courts repeatedly insist that partition actions are not sub-
stitutes for actions to try title.219 Actions to try title and for partition are often
brought together in the same suit; but partition is not intended to be a substitute
for normal processes for quieting title. Nevertheless, in the decree ending the
initial phase of partition in kind, Texas courts usually exercise equitable discre-
tion to determine title issues necessary to decide whether the property can be
partitioned in kind, as well as what are the proportionate shares of the joint
owners. 2
0
Under Texas Property Code § 23.004, a final decree of partition of real
property has the effect of warranty deeds to the separated parts from or to each
of the former joint owners." If the jointly held title turns out to have been
defective in whole or in part, such title warranties will result in all of the for-
mer joint owners shouldering proportionate risks of title failure with regard to
any part of the partitioned property. Although regulatory matters such as well-
spacing, unitization and various regulatory actions of the Texas Railroad Com-
mission affect how practically useful for the purposes of actual mineral, oil or
gas production each of the allocated shares will be, Texas courts have not con-
sidered the regulation of oil and gas production to be relevant to compulsory
partition allocations.
If partition in kind is voluntary, the partition agreement among the joint
owners transfers equitable title in severalty to the divided share allotted to each
of the former joint owners. Formal conveyances are necessary before the legal
title to a separate part allocated by the agreement transfers to the former joint
owner to whom it was allotted. Since oral partition agreements are valid in
Texas and the Texas title registration statute does not apply to partition agree-
ments, there is no requirement that a partition agreement be recorded. However,
recorded cross-conveyances are customary both to preserve clear title and to
prevent a bona fide purchaser from later acquiring an undivided interest in the
216. 163 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). See also Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Kirkindall, 145
S.W.2d 1074 (rex. 1941).
217. 206 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947, writ ref'd).
218. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.004(a) (West 1995).
219. See, eg., Green v. Churchwell, 222 S.W. 341 (rex. 1920).
220. TEX. R. CIv. PRO. 760. "Upon the hearing of the cause, the court shall determine... all questions
of law or equity affecting the title to such land which may arise." Id.
221. The Property Code provides that the "court decree confirming a report of commissioners ... gives a
recipient of an interest in the property a title equivalent to a conveyance of the interest by a warranty deed
from the other parties int he action." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.004(b) (West 1995).
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partitioned property from a former joint owner. Such concerns may also lead to
the inclusion of express disclaimers of owelty in partition deeds.
When property is partitioned in kind, the shares allocated to the former
joint owners are supposed to be equal in value to the former joint owners'
proportionate shares of undivided ownership. However, a variety of factors,
such as physical features of the property being partitioned, homestead rights,
equitable considerations and the like, can make proportional division impossi-
ble. To equalize the value of the partitioned shares, partitioning courts have the
power to order payment of an equalizing charge known as owelty.2" Partition
agreements, which voluntarily allocate shares of jointly owned property may
also provide for owelty payments to equalize the shares determined by volun-
tary agreement." 3 After partition, if the owelty payment was not made at the
time of partition, a lien for unpaid owelty attaches to the share partitioned sub-
ject to owelty. Although court-ordered owelty appears as part of a final partition
decree, when partition is by voluntary agreement, it is more difficult to deter-
mine the presence of a lien for owelty unless a partition deed expressly attaches
or disclaims owelty.
The Supreme Court of Texas recently considered the application of the
concept of owelty in the context of partitioning mineral interests in MAPCO,
Inc. v Carter, discussed above. 4 The trial court had found that the jointly
owned tract of land could be partitioned in kind, including a part of the proper-
ty where an artificial hydrocarbon storage cavern had been created within a salt
dome. The portion of the property where the cavern was located was allotted to
the successor to the joint owner which had created the cavern. But that allot-
ment was subject to an owelty lien of $450,000. Moreover, the trial court en-
tered an owelty judgment for $450,000 against the parent corporation of the
joint owner which created the cavern. The lien could be foreclosed if the owelty
judgment was not paid by the parent corporation of the former joint owner
which had created the cavern.2 The Supreme Court of Texas reversed this
owelty payment order because the parent corporation had not been a party to
the partition action and there was no basis for entering judgment against the
parent corporation under alter ego, piercing the corporate veil or agency theo-
ries."6 The Supreme Court remanded "to the trial court solely to determine
against whom the owelty award may properly be entered."227
Several factors can affect the allocation of title to particular parts of prop-
erty partitioned in kind to particular joint owners. Three of the more important
are the doctrine of equitable partition, improvements and homestead rights. As
222. See Sayers v. Pyland, 161 S.W.2d 769 (fex. 1942).
223. Id. at 772.
224. MAPCO, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (Tex. 1991), affg in part 808 S.W.2d 262 (rex.
App. 1991, writ granted). See discussion supra at notes 73-74.
225. Id. at 687.
226. Id. at 688.
227. MAPCO, Inc., 817 S.W.2d at 688.
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discussed above,"5 the doctrine of equitable partition is sometimes the basis
for allocating title to a particular portion of the jointly owned property to one of
the former joint owners. The purpose of this remedial doctrine is to enable a
joint owner to "make good" an earlier unilateral sale of a physical portion of
the jointly owned property to a person outside the joint ownership arrangement.
If that previously sold portion is greater in value than the selling joint owner's
proportionate share of the undivided property, an award of owelty may result.
Larrison v. Walker 9 provides one of the clearest explanations of the Texas
doctrine of equitable partition:
[T]he deeds of a tenant in common to specific parcels of the land are not
absolutely void. They are always good as against the grantor. Such deeds
do not convey or destroy any of the title of the nonjoining cotenants to
their undivided interest to the lands described in the deeds. The
nonjoining cotenants may avoid such deeds, if and to the extent only they
are injured by such deeds. Though one cotenant has no power to divest
the title of other cotenants by selling specific parts of the common proper-
ty, yet under the well-settled doctrine of equitable partition the court in
adjusting the equities of all the interested parties will protect such pur-
chasers by setting aside to them the particular parts purchased, if it can be
done without injury to the other owners, where, as here the acreage of the
common property is of equal and uniform value; and will set aside to the
nonjoining cotenants the equivalent of their interest in all the unsold tract
if it is sufficient to satisfy same ....
The doctrine simply causes a specific portion of what was once jointly owned
property to be allocated as the share of a joint owner who had already sold that
portion of the property.
The Supreme Court of Texas in Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev.
Co.,"' ruled that the doctrine of equitable partition may also apply to convey-
ances of mineral estates. The Texas Supreme Court explained in Thomas that
the doctrine of equitable partition: "[I]s an equitable doctrine which concerns
itself primarily in protecting the vendee in the part of the land conveyed to him,
when and to the extent that this can be done without prejudice to the cotenants
of the whole tract, and which in the attainment of such primary object under-
takes fairly to adjust the equities of all of the interested parties." 2 The name,
"doctrine of equitable partition," has caused much confusion because, as dis-
cussed above, Texas also recognizes a non-statutory process for compulsory
partition as "equitable partition."'233 In rejecting a claim to a portion of a min-
eral estate based on equitable partition doctrine, the Court of Appeals in
228. See text supra accompanying notes 130-32.
229. 149 S.W.2d 172, 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941, writ ref'd.)
230. Id. at 177.
231. 123 S.W.2d 290, 300 (Tex. 1939).
232. Id. at 296.
233. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 776, "No provision of the statutes or rules relating to partition
shall... preclude partition in any other manner authorized by the rules of equity, which rules shall govern in
proceedings for partition in all respects not provided for by law or these rules." See, e.g., MAPCO, Inc. v.
Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686 ('ex. 1991).
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Barfield v. Holland, noted that "We have not found a case... that defines the
doctrine of equitable partition."'
Occasionally, improvements made by one joint owner may affect the allo-
cation of title to particular parts of jointly owned property to particular joint
owners. With regard to improvements, partitioning courts will adjust the equi-
ties among joint owners by allocating the portion of the property where the
improvements are located to the improving joint owner if that can be done
without prejudicing the rights of the other joint owners.2 3 In White v.
Smyth,' the trial court did not consider the pit rock asphalt mine to be an
improvement which would affect the allocation of that part, even if the mineral
estate had been partitioned in kind. However, improvements can affect the
allotment of particular parts of partitioned property to particular former joint
owners who have built structures or made other such improvements.
Homestead property, which is protected under the Texas Constitution, 7
can also lead to allocation of title to the portion of the jointly owned property
where a homestead has been claimed to the former joint owner claiming the
homestead. Such a partition allocation protects the right to occupy which is at
the core the homestead right. When more than one joint owner claims a home-
stead in jointly owned property, adjusting the allocation of partitioned shares
can become complicated. Mineral estates and mineral leases are unlikely to be
subject to homestead claims. But when full fee ownership or the surface estate
are partitioned, the allocation of title to specific parts can be affected by home-
stead rights to occupy the surface. Were protection of the homestead rights of
one of the joint owners to require allocation in kind of a share disproportionate
to the undivided interest of the joint owner who claims the homestead, owelty
could an be awarded to equalize the values of the allocated shares.23'
In addition, as noted above, among the more peculiar potential title conse-
quences of partition in kind is the possibility of ouster of a joint owner who
was not included in a partition agreement. 9 As noted above, in Republic Pro-
duction Co. v. Lee,2" the Commission of Appeals ruled that voluntary parti-
tioh in kind had ousted a nonparticipating joint owner and started the statute of
limitations running against the nonparticipating joint owner for the purposes of
adverse possession. Although usual rules with regard to adverse possession
normally make it difficult for one joint owner to adversely possess against an-
other, repudiation of a joint owner's title "in such a manner as to bring such
repudiation to the notice of the other cotenants" is sufficient to start the statute
234. 844 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. App. 1992, writ denied).
235. See Cleveland v. Milner, 170 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1943).
236. 214 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1948).
237. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
238. See discussion in text supra notes 222-27.
239. When partition in kind is ordered by a court, the procedures in Rules of Civil Procedure 758 and 759
provide for service by publication and appointed representation if there are joint owners whose identities or
residences are unknown. However, voluntary partition does not contemplate representation of all absent or
unknown joint owners and can result in ouster.
240. 121 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm'n. App. 1938). See discussion supra notes 125-29.
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of limitations running for the purposes of adverse possession in Texas.24'
B. Title Consequences of Partition by Sale
Because of Texas' known-mineral-lands rule discussed above in connection
with White v. Smyth, statutory partition of property which is producing minerals
or oil and gas, will in most cases be accomplished by sale. 2 In the initial
phase of the three-phase statutory partition process outlined above, the initial
decree of partition is likely to determine that jointly owned mineral or oil and
gas property is not partitionable in kind. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
770, the court is then directed to order an execution or receiver's sale,243
which transfers title to the jointly owned property to a new owner in exchange
for money, which is divided proportionately among the former joint owners."
After deducting the expenses of the sale, the sales proceeds are allocated among
the former joint owners in proportion to their joint ownership interests. From
the point of view of a joint owner, partition by sale transforms an undivided
right to real property into money.
A glimpse of how this process applies to a mineral lease is provided in
L&M Oil Co. v. Richey,2' 4 in which the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a tri-
al court's confirmation of a receiver's sale of jointly owned oil and gas leases
to the highest bidder. The title to the leases transferred to the purchaser at the
sale. The proceeds of the partition sale were returned to the court and, after
deducting expenses, allocated among the former joint owners according to their
respective interests. In some cases, the property is purchased at the partition
sale by one or more of the former joint owners.
Because partition will not be allowed to destroy homestead rights, compul-
sory partition by sale can be blocked if one or more of the joint owners claims
a homestead in the jointly owned property.2' Homestead property cannot not
be sold as long as the homestead persists. In Patterson v. First Nat'l Bank of
Lake Jackson,247 the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was prop-
er against an action for partition by sale of a residence which became jointly
owned by the two former spouses after their divorce. Eventually, the interest of
one of the former spouses was purchased by a creditor bank at the foreclosure
sale of that undivided interest. The court ruled that, because the Texas Constitu-
241. Spiller v. Woodward, 809 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App. 1991).
242. But see MAPCO, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991) (finding partition in kind of a mineral
estate to be possible).
243. "Should the court be of the opinion that a fair and equitable division of the real estate, or any part
thereof, cannot be made, it shall order a sale of so much as is incapable of partition, which sale shall be for
cash, or upon such other terms as the court may direct, and shall be made as under execution or by private or
public sale through a receiver, if the court so order, and the proceeds thereof shall be returned into court and
be partitioned among the persons entitled thereto, according to their respective interests." TEX. R. CIv. PRO.
770.
244. Occasionally, one or more of the joint owners will purchase the property at the sale. See discussion
infra notes 281-83.
245. 618 S.W.2d 956 (rex. Civ. App. 1981, writ ref'd. n.r.e).
246. See, e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 45 S.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1931).
247. 921 S.W.2d 240 (rex. App. 1996).
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tion protects a homestead against forced sale, "The homestead character of a
residence is an affirmative defense to a claim for partition by sale."' In the
case of mineral or oil and gas interests, homestead issues should be rare. How-
ever, any surface estate or unsevered fee property could be affected by home-
stead rights, the existence of which would prevent partition by sale. Were the
mineral or oil and gas property already determined to be not partitionable in
kind, the joint ownership title would remain in the joint owners until the home-
stead right was terminated, such as by transfer to other property.
C. Tax Consequences of Partition
Even though joint owners of oil and gas interests, or other mineral inter-
ests, are usually concerned about tax consequences, Texas courts do not consid-
er tax consequences in deciding whether and how to partition these jointly
owned interests. In Moseley v. Hearrell, Mrs. Hearrell objected to forced parti-
tion by sale of her jointly owned oil and gas working interest on the grounds
that "she would be compelled to pay a large federal income tax out of her re-
ceipts from the sale."249 But the Supreme Court of Texas rejected her argu-
ment and held that even a large potential tax liability does not make partition
inequitable. The court reasoned that since partition is an absolute, positive right
of any joint owner of a possessory interest, the risk that joint ownership inter-
ests will be partitioned by sale is inherent in jointly owning possessory interests
in Texas oil and gas properties, irrespective of the tax consequences." In
contrast, the application of federal tax law often depends on Texas law regard-
ing the nature of joint ownership interests and partition. The United States
Supreme Court recognized the impact of state property law regarding oil and
gas interests on Federal tax law in Burnet v. Harmel: "The state law creates
legal interests, but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be
taxed."' ' In Helvering v. Stuart, the Supreme Court reminded that whether a
taxable "event may or may not occur depends upon the interpretation placed
upon the terms of the instrument by state law. Once rights are obtained by local
law, whatever they may be called, these rights are subject to the federal defimi-
tion of taxability." 2
This article is not intended to provide an exhaustive treatment of all of the
potential tax consequences of partition for any particular joint owner of a Texas
mineral or oil and gas property. Tax consequences in individual cases depend
on the exact circumstances of the taxpayer and the property. Tax liability can
be affected by the nature of the person or entity holding the joint ownership
interest, by how long the interest has been held and by other factors. Depending
248. Id. at 243 (citing Bennet v. State Nat'l Bank, 623 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
249. Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337, 338 (Tex. 1943).
250. White v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1948) (holding that known mineral lands should not be parti-
tioned in kind because of the unpredictability of mineral deposits).
251. 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
252. 317 U.S. 154, 162 (1942).
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on the situation of a particular joint owner, partition can generate recognition of
income or loss and, among other tax consequences, can also affect deductions
for depletion and for intangible drilling costs. These and other tax matters are
likely to be of great practical importance to a particular partitioning joint owner.
Nevertheless, this discussion can point out on some of the more general factors
which can affect tax consequences resulting from partition of oil and gas and
other mineral interests in Texas.
The most important factor directly affecting the federal tax consequences
of partitioning Texas mineral, oil and gas interests is whether partition will be
treated as a taxable event or a nontaxable transaction. Although simple partition
in kind is often treated as a nontaxable transaction, even partition in kind, if it
is a complex partition, can be treated as a potentially taxable exchange, the
results of which may or may not qualify for nonrecognition. On the other hand,
partition by sale is almost by definition a taxable event, although in some cases,
income or gain may not be recognized if the partition sale is structured appro-
priately. This discussion of the tax consequences of partition focuses primarily
on these differences in tax treatment resulting from partition in kind as opposed
to partition by sale. The first portion of the discussion will consider the tax
consequences of simple partition in kind and then look into more complex
partitions in kind, before turning to the tax consequences of partition by sale. A
concluding section will address some other tax-related concerns.
1. Tax Consequences of Simple Partition in Kind
For most federal tax purposes a simple partition in kind is not considered a
taxable event. The notion that a taxable event is necessary to trigger potential
tax liability is implicit in § 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which refers
to gains and losses from "the sale or disposition of property." 3 The transfor-
mation of a joint owner's undivided fractional interest in the whole of a jointly
owned property into sole ownership of a part of that same property is normally
not treated as a disposition of property for tax purposes, unless other factors,
such as exchanges of interests in multiple jointly owned properties or owelty
awards or reallocation of mortgage liability, accompany the partition in kind.
A 1978 General Counsel Memorandum explains that
In a partition, the co-owners sever their joint interests. They do not ac-
quire a new or additional interest as a result of a partition.... Thus, if
the transaction in question is an exchange, each party has given up prop-
erty in return for other property while if the transaction is a partition, each
party has merely severed his interest from the jointly held propertyY4
253. For a discussion of the concept of a taxable event, see B. Br1rKER AND L. LOKKEN, 2 FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES GiFrs § 40-4 (2d ed. 1990). Bittker and Lokken explain that although in
most cases sales are quite clearly taxable transactions, "Occasionally, it is more difficult to determine whether
a 'sale or other disposition 'has occurred within the meaning of § 1001 (a)." Among the categories of "ambig-
uous transactions," the authors include "division of property between co-owners" Id. at § 40-44.
254. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37714 (Oct. 5, 1978). This 1978 memorandum modified two earlier memoranda,
G.C.M. 23022 and G.C.M. 23757, which had treated divisions of multiple jointly owned properties into sepa-
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For example, Revenue Ruling 56-437 determined that eliminating survivorship
or changing joint tenancy ownership of corporate stock into two separate stock
certificates in the names of each of the joint tenants is a "nontaxable transac-
tion," and "not a sale within the meaning of the income tax law." 5  In
Carrieres v. CIR, a case involving division of community property, the Tax
Court described the treatment of partition as a nontaxable event as a "nonstatu-
tory nonrecognition rule." 6 Whether partition is conceptualized as a nonevent
for federal income tax purposes, which does not result in recognition of income
or loss, or as "nonrealization," 7 simple partition in kind is usually not a tax-
generating event.
There is remarkably little direct guidance from the courts or from the Inter-
nal Revenue Service with regard to tax treatment of partition in kind of oil and
gas working interests or other possessory mineral interests z 8 However, pri-
vate letter rulings with regard to other types of property continue to take the
position that "A partition of jointly owned property is not a sale or other dispo-
sition of property where the co-owners of the joint property sever their joint
interests, but do not acquire a new or additional interest as a result thereof." 9
In short, simple partition in kind is usually viewed as making no real change in
ownership when a taxpayer's undivided share of a larger asset is transformed by
partition into a solely owned divided share in the same proportion of the same
asset.
2. Tax Consequences of Complex Partition in Kind
More complicated instances of partition in kind may, however, be treated
as taxable events. When there are multiple parcels of jointly owned real proper-
ty and joint ownership interests in all of them are exchanged for separate own-
ership of particular parcels by each of the joint owners, this more complex
partition in kind is treated as a potentially taxable exchange, rather than as a
nontaxable transaction. This complex type of partition is treated as a taxable
event because it involves exchanging one type of interest for a different type of
rately owned properties of equal value as nontaxable partitions. The Service now treats this type of transfer of
joint ownership interests in more than one property in exchange for sole ownership of a single property as ex-
changes, which may or may not qualify for nonrecognition treatment under Section 1031(a).
255. Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507.
256. 64 T.C. 959, 963 (1975) acq., affd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977).
257. Jonathan D. Kaney, Jr., Federal Income Taxation of Exchanges in Partition of Commonly Owned
Property: Realization vs. Realism, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 629 (1980).
258. One exception is a Technical Advice Memorandum, in which the Service provided guidance with
regard to percentage depletion deductions under the independent producers' and royalty owners' exemption
when community property is partitioned at divorce. Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-29-003 (March 21, 1984). The mem-
orandum notes that, for qualified oil and gas properties, partition would result in the loss of percentage deple-
tion only to the extent that one of the divorcing spouses acquired more than fifty percent in any particular
property. Id.
259. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9709028 (February 28, 1997) (citing Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507). This private
letter ruling involves a revocable trust; but it discusses a number of issues, including recognition of gain or
loss under section 1001.
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interest. A frequent example of complex partition in kind occurs when undi-
vided interests in several jointly owned properties are exchanged for sole own-
ership of a particular property. At one time, the Internal Revenue Service took
the position that divisions of this type, which resulted in ownership of property
equal in value to the joint ownership interest of each of the joint owners before
the partition, were nontaxable events because they were not really exchanges at
all26 However, Revenue Ruling 79-44 treats such complex partitions as ex-
changes which are potentially taxable unless the exchange qualifies for nonrec-
ognition under section 1031."' A General Counsel Memorandum discusses
Revenue Ruling 73-476 and the treatment of such conversions of joint owner-
ship of multiple properties into separate ownership of particular properties as
exchanges which are "disposition[s] of property" under section 1001(a). 2
This General Counsel Memorandum also considers the potential treatment of
such complex partitions as like-kind exchanges for which income is not recog-
nized under section 1031. With regard to the partition of each of two jointly
owned parcels of farmland into two separately owned parcels, the memorandum
concludes that this type of complex partition-exchange of multiple properties in
which there is "an exchange of interests in real estate held for productive use in
the taxpayers' farming business qualifies a like-kind exchange under section
1031 ."26
Because mineral, oil and gas interests are real property, there is a broad
category of potentially "like-kind" real property which may qualify for like-
kind-exchange treatment. For example, in the well-known Fifth Circuit decision,
Commissioner v. Crichton, the court considered a tax case in which, in ex-
change for her children's one half interest in an improved city lot, Mrs.
Crichton transferred "as of equal value an undivided 3/12 interest in the 'oil,
gas and other minerals, in, on and under, and that may be produced' from" a
tract of unimproved country land. 4 Under the sections of the Internal Reve-
nue Code in effect at the time, the issue was whether the exchange was "solely
in kind."'2 The court ruled that "under Louisiana law, mineral rights are in-
terests not in personal but in real property, and.., the rights exchanged were
real [property] rights." The court concluded that there was "no doubt that
no gain or loss is realized by one, other than a dealer, from an exchange of real
estate, and the distinction intended and made by the statute is the broad one
between classes and characters of properties, for instance, between real and
260. Gen. Couns. Mem. 23022 (Dec. 5, 1941) and Gen. Couns. Mem. 23757 (May 28, 1943).
261. Rev. Rul. 79-44, 1979-1 C.B. 265. Section 1031 is concerned with "[e]xchange of Property Held for
Productive Use or Investment." Subsection (a) provides for "[nlonrecognition of Gain or Loss from Exchang-
es Solely in Kind" and states that "No gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of property held for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment if such property is exchanged solely for property of
like kind which is to be held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment." I.R.C. §1031(a)(1).
262. Gen. Coun. Mem. 37714 (October 5, 1978).
263. Id.
264. 122F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941).
265. Id. at 182.
266. Id.
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personal property. It was not intended to draw any distinction between parcels
of real property however dissimilar they may be in location, in attributes and in
capacities for profitable use."
A similar Fifth Circuit decision considered the exchange of "an undivided
fractional oil, gas and other mineral interest in Ector County, Texas, for over-
riding royalty and mineral interests in and to the oil in and under named lease-
hold estates in Gregg County, Texas, until grantee had received oil of the value
of $43,000."" The Fifth Circuit ruled that this exchange qualified as a like-
kind exchange. Both interests were real property mineral interests. "Both were
therefore interests in land, interests not in personal but in real property, in short,
real [property] rights." 9
Although the Internal Revenue Service has not expressly addressed the
treatment of complex partition of multiple jointly owned oil and gas or mineral
interests, the Service's position with regard to unitization provides some indica-
tion that application of similar rules would be the probable treatment of such
partitions. Unitization is in some ways functionally the reverse of complex
partition in kind, since multiple solely owned oil and gas properties are con-
veyed into the unit which operates the properties jointly. The Internal Revenue
Service applies a pool-of-capital or exchange theory with regard to federal tax
treatment of unitization as a like-kind transfer under Internal Revenue Code
Section 1031. The Internal Revenue Manual discusses unitization in Sub-Sec-
tion 460 of § 4232.8:
The Internal Revenue Service position follows the exchange theory (Rev.
Rul. 68-186, 1968-1 C.B. 354). Under this theory, the formation of a unit
will fall under the single property provision of IRC 614(b)(3) and consti-
tutes a tax-free exchange of property under the provisions of IRC 1031.
IRC 1031 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized if property
held for productive use in a trade or business is exchanged solely for
property of a like kind. Therefore, the exchanges of property interests will
be deemed to be exchanges of property for like kind, even though one
property may be developed and the other property undeveloped. Gain will
be recognized only to the extent of any boot received, whether in the form
of cash or other property of unlike kind. [IRC 1031(c)] Loss from such an
exchange will not be recognized. If the property exchanged was held for
more than the required holding period, the recognized gain would qualify
for capital gain treatment under IRC 1231. However, the taxpayer will
realize ordinary gain if the property exchanged qualifies as IRC 1245
property.'
267. Id. at 182.
268. Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1953).
269. Id. at 550.
270. I.R.M. 4232.8 HB 460, para.5. The Manual notes that the House Ways and Means Committee Report
regarding Internal Revenue Code § 1254 recapture (IDC), contains the reminder that, "Also, for purposes of
this [IDC recapture] provision, a unitization or pooling arrangement (within the meaning of IRC 614(b)(3)) is
not to be treated as a disposition." The Manual also remarks that "[V]ery little has been written dealing with
the subject of recapture of IRC 1254 property if boot is received. For details of IRS position, see proposed
regulations relating to IRC 1254."
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A later paragraph notes that
Unitization usually includes not only the mineral interest but also depre-
ciable equipment. Generally, a party to a unitization agreement will have
a leasehold cost, which will become his/her basis for the participating
interest in the new unit If the working interest owner has depreciable
equipment, the adjusted basis of the depreciable equipment becomes the
basis of his/her interest in the unitized equipment Boot received upon the
unitization exchange is considered to be for a sale of property. Gain must
be allocated between the equipment and the leasehold. I
A General Counsel Memorandum has observed that "tax problems in this area
will flow from a characterization of the unitization as an exchange of proper-
ties. That it is the proper characterization of the transaction should finally be
settled. '' m Since the Service takes a pragmatic approach to the realities of
unitization, it would be likely to take a similar approach to a complex partition
of multiple jointly owned oil and gas or mineral properties.
Another type of complex partition-in-kind situation involves receipt of
additional property or consideration, sometimes called "boot," by a partitioning
joint owner, in addition to a proportional part of the jointly owned property.
This could occur, for example, when owelty accompanies partition in kind. If
partition in kind is accompanied by other transactions or payments, such as
reallocation of depletion, owelty payments, or an accounting, then the partition
may constitute an exchange not solely in kind under Section 1031(b). 73 An
instance of an offsetting note and mortgage liability in connection with partition
of farmland is discussed in General Counsel Memorandum 37714,"7 discussed
above, and in Revenue Ruling 79-44. In Revenue Ruling 79-44 the Service
concludes, "Gain on the exchange is recognized only to the farmer receiving the
note and only to the extent of the fair market value of such note."'75 Oil and
gas or mineral property has not been specifically addressed in this connection
by the Internal Revenue Service. However, compensating property or payments
271. Id. at para. 7.
272. Gen. Coun. Mem. 33536 (June 19, 1967). A footnote to the memorandum provides the following
somewhat puzzling explanation of the theories underlying tax treatment of unitization:
There are three theoretical characterizations of a unitization. Two may be termed exchange theories. The Ser-
vice adheres to the theory that the participant exchanges all of his interests in his property for an undivided
interest in the unit. The other exchange theory is that the participant retains an interest in his own property
equal to his percentage interest in the unit, and exchanges the remainder of the interest in his property for his
share of the properties contributed by other participants. The third theory may be termed the production ar-
rangement theory. This has had unanimous acceptance by the courts and it concludes that a unitization is
merely a convenient arrangement for the production of oil which accomplished not change in the property unit
held by the participant. However, under the production arrangement theory when formal cross-conveyancing is
involved the courts would presumably agree that an exchange has taken place. Id. footnote 1.
273. I.R.C. § 1031(b) provides, with regard to "Gain from Exchanges not Solely in Kind" that "If an
exchange would be within the provisions of subsection (a) ... if it were not for the fact that the property re-
ceived in exchange consists not only of property permitted by such provisions to be received without the
recognition of gain, but also of other property or money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall e recog-
nized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other prop-
erty."
274. See supra note 251.
275. Rev. Rul. 79-44, 1979-1 C.B. 265.
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would probably be treated as "other property or money" for purposes of section
1031(b), and subject to recognition to the extent of the gain realized on the ex-
change 76
3. Tax Consequences of Partition by Sale
Partition by sale is by definition a taxable event, subject to recognition of
gain or loss under section 1001, unless nonrecognition rules can be made to
apply.2" When partition is accomplished by sale, the only realistic basis for
nonrecognition is the exception for like-kind exchange under Internal Revenue
Code § 1031(a) discussed above." Since in Texas, jointly owned mineral, oil
and gas interests are generally partitioned by sale, under the known-mineral-
lands rule of White v. Smyth, 9 partitions of such interests will usually result
in tax treatment as a sale. A partitioning joint owner will realize income under
Section 1001, unless a deferred like-kind exchange, under section 1031(a)(3)
and the applicable regulations, is arranged. Such a partition transaction would
require advance arrangement for a "qualified intermediary" so that the parti-
tioning joint owner never receives any of the cash from the partition sale. If the
proceeds from the partition sale are channeled through such an intermediary
into a qualifying like-kind real property interest, recognition of income, or loss,
may be avoided. But the disposition of the proceeds of the partition sale should
be structured to qualify under the highly complex safe-harbor like-kind ex-
change rules established in Internal Revenue Regulations § 1.1031(k)-l.aw
Moreover, when partition by sale results in a joint owner repurchasing her
own interest, the partition sale has been treated as not a sale with regard to the
repurchased interest. 28' For example, in Hunnicutt v. Commissioner,sa the
276. Cf. I.R.M. 4243.8 HB 460, para. 7.
277. Partition is unlikely to be considered an involuntary conversion under Section 1033, although it is
theoretically possible for a taxpayer, who has reinvested the proceeds of a partition sale in accordance with
the requirements of IRC § 1033, to seek to avoid recognition of income under this section. The sparse deci-
sional law regarding partition in the context of Section 1033 seems to indicate that forced partition against the
wishes and over the protests of one or more of the joint owners would not constitute an involuntary conver-
sion permitting nonrecognition of gain or loss. See, eg., Roth v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 82 (1977)
(holding that Section 1033(a) did not apply). Roth involved a voluntary partition of real property by sale to
which eight joint beneficiaries agreed after the termination of a trust: "[T]he evidence clearly indicates that no
such destruction, theft, or seizure occurred. Id. The Tax Court went on to advise, "Nor do we believe the
court-ordered partition by sale of the property and division of the proceeds among the eight beneficiaries of
the trust constitute a requisition or condemnation within the meaning of section 1033(a). It is well established
that the term 'requisition or condemnation' as used in the statute means the taking of the property by a gov-
emmental authority for the use of the taker." Id. In short, partition is unlikely to qualify as an involuntary
conversion under Internal Revenue Code § 1033(a).
278. See Internal Revenue Code Section 1031(a) (providing for "[nonrecognition of gain or loss from
exchanges solely in kind."). See discussion supra at notes 261-69.
279. 214 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1948).
280. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1031(k)-I (1997), 59 Fed. Reg. 18747 (1994).
281. Rev. Rul. 55-77, 1955-1 C.B. 339. This ruling considered a forced partition sale the purpose of
which was to buy-out one of five joint owners of improved real property. Four of the joint owners, including
the Taxpayer, joined in purchasing the property at the partition sale. "Held, under these circumstances, the
partition proceedings constituted a nontaxable transaction for Federal income tax purposes. The taxpayer nei-
ther realized a taxable gain nor sustained a deductible loss on the sale of the undivided interest in the property
which he owned immediately prior to the proceedings. The Taxpayer still owns the interest which he owned
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Board of Tax Appeals considered a partition sale involving some jointly owned
cotton land in Georgia. Mrs. Mary Hunnicutt owned a two-thirds joint own-
ership interest, with the other one-third owned by R.L. Moss. Eventually rela-
tions between Hunnicutt and Moss soured and resulted in a sale of the land at
auction. At the auction Hunnicutt purchased 379.1 acres of the land she had
formerly jointly owned with Moss. The Board ruled that:
[t]he petitioner could not derive a profit from this sale of 379.1 acres,
neither could she sustain a loss, because she sold nothing as far as they
are concerned. The only effect at the auction as to this acreage was to
establish the price at which the petitioner purchased the undivided interest
of Moss therein.""
This pragmatic approach to evaluating actual ownership interests before and
after partition has been a consistent feature of the relatively rare court decisions
and other guidance regarding the tax consequences of partition by sale.
4. Other Tax-Related Concerns
Attracting the interest of tax assessors or other tax authorities can be
among the more worrisome practical consequences of partition. The poignant
case of Dr. Lucci illustrates some of the collateral tax problems which partition
can generate?" A 1986 voluntary partition resulted in Dr. Lucci becoming
sole owner of the surface estate of two parcels of land in Bexar County. The
tract out of which the two parcels were partitioned had qualified for an agricul-
tural use exemption under Texas Tax Code § 23.51.
Two years after the partition, the county tax appraiser denied Lucci's two
tracts the agricultural use exemption and imposed an additional agricultural roll-
back tax for the previous five years. No notice of the denial of the exemption
was required under the statute, only a statement that additional taxes were
owed. Unfortunately, the statement regarding additional taxes was sent to one of
Lucci's former joint owners, despite Lucci's repeated requests that the assessor
carry the two tracts under his name rather than under the name of one of the
prior joint owners. According to the Court of Appeals, "Lucci first learned of
the denial of the agricultural use exemption-and the taxing unit's claim that he
owed almost $20,000 in taxes-in September 1989, when Bexar County and
other taxing units filed two suits... seeking to collect delinquent taxes, penal-
ties, interests, and costs." '2 Dr. Lucci counterclaimed for denial of his due
process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Eventually, Dr. Lucci prevailed and was
awarded his attorney fees and costs. However, he would never have had to
prior to the sale; hence, he sold nothing. The effect of the sale was to establish a price at which the taxpayer
could purchase the undivided interest of one of the other tenants in common." In other words, this repurchase
at a partition sale was treated as an acquisition by the taxpayer of an additional undivided interest, but not as
a sale of his pre-partition joint ownership interest.
282. 10 B.T.A. 1004, (Bd. Tax App. 1928).
283. Id. at 1007.
284. See State v. Southoaks Dev. Co., Inc., 920 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App. 1995, writ denied).
285. Id. at 333.
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engage in such litigation had the apparently amicable partition not, as a practi-
cal matter, attracted the attention of local authorities and started a chain of
adverse tax consequences.
VI. NO-PARTrIION AGREEMENTS
Although under Texas law, an unconditional right to partition is a funda-
mental aspect of joint ownership, Texas courts are also remarkably accommo-
dating when joint owners agree not to partition jointly owned property, espe-
cially mineral, oil and gas interests. This favorable attitude toward no-partition
agreements appears to reflect a more general policy underlying Texas court
decisions which readily enforce various other types of agreements among joint
owners.
U6
By the early 1940s no-partition agreements had become such a common
feature of Texas mineral, oil and gas practice that the Supreme Court of Texas
tartly remarked in connection with a partition sale of an oil and gas lease that,
"[i]t may sometimes be inequitable to one or more of the joint owners if anoth-
er co-owner is permitted to enforce partition of the jointly owned property; but
this is one of the consequences which one assumes when he does not provide
against it by contract, he may expect his cotenant to exercise his statutory right
of partition at will." 7 The legality of no-partition agreements is rarely ques-
tioned in Texas. Rather, in Texas partition litigation, a much more frequently
litigated issue is whether or not joint owners have impliedly entered into such
an agreement not to partition.
A. Express Restrictions on Partition
Sometimes wills devising property to joint owners contain express provi-
sions restricting partition. For example, a testator may direct that particular
property bequeathed to joint owners "will be held intact and not partitioned" for
a period of time, often the lifetime of one or more of the joint devisees." It
is more common for joint owners to sign an express written agreement not to
partition. Such agreements can take a variety of forms. Often express agree-
ments not to partition are fairly short. "Joint owner, X, agrees with joint owner,
Y, that neither will seek voluntary or judicial partition of [identified jointly
owned property] for a period of [specified] time. '
A no-partition agreement sometimes recites reasons for restricting partition
in an effort to substantiate the agreement's reasonableness were the agreement
to be challenged. However, Texas court decisions virtually never consider the
reasons behind express agreements among joint owners to partition or to restrict
286. See discussion supra notes 8-13.
287. Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex 1943).
288. 14 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d (Rev) §193.97 (1994).
289. See 14 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d (Rev) §193.96 (1994)
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partition of their jointly owned property. Since each joint owner has an intrinsic
and unconditional right to partition, preventing partition requires the agreement
of each of the joint owners. Without 100% agreement, any joint owner who did
not participate in the no-partition agreement could still bring a compulsory
partition action. As a result, the only way to prevent partition is by reaching
complete consensus among all of the joint owners.2'
Although no-partition agreements restrain alienation, Texas court decisions
usually find limited restrictions on partition to be reasonable."' Whether a
complete restriction on partition unlimited in time would be considered reason-
able remains to be decided by Texas courts. In the context of no-partition
agreements, only one reported Texas appellate decision has expressed qualms
about restraining partition for an unreasonable period of time.9 Older Texas
court decisions regarding unreasonable restraints on alienation were somewhat
variable.293 However, recently the Supreme Court of Texas has held valid con-
tractual provisions which indirectly affect the alienability of real property.94
Since jointly owned oil and gas and other mineral property, as well as the joint
ownership. interests in it, remain transferrable under a no-partition agreement, a
similar finding of validity in response to unreasonable-restraint-on-alienation
objections might be expected with regard to no-partition agreements.
Texas practice seems to avoid elaborate versions of no-partition agree-
ments. Only rarely are no-partition agreements formal recorded real covenants
which run with the land. 5 A typical no-partition covenant of the more formal
variety would begin with a declaration of the fractional interests of the joint
owners with regard to identified jointly owned property.' After reciting con-
sideration, usually based on mutual promises, such a no-partition covenant may
provide that each joint owner "for himself and his heirs and assigns, covenants
and agrees that he will not institute or cause to be instituted any partition or
division of the property without the written consent of the other" joint owners
who are parties to the agreement, or their heirs or assigns. 7 Usually such a
real covenant is limited to a specified period of time, such as twenty years or
the lifetime of one or more of the joint owners. If no time period is stated,
Texas courts will usually imply a reasonable time.29
More formal no-partition agreements may also include a management
provision which delegates management authority regarding the jointly owned
290. See Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex 1943).
291. See Davis v. Davis, 44 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
292. See Spires v. Hoover, 466 S.W.2d 344 (rex Civ. App. 1971). Cf. I SMrrH & WEAVER, supra note
20, at § 2.3(A)(4).
293. See, e.g., Citizens State Bank of Houston v. O'Leary, 167 S.W.2d. 719 (Tex. 1942); O'Connor v.
Thetford, 174 S.W. 680 (rex. Civ. App. 1915, writ ref'd.).
294. See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Savings, 633 S.W.2d. 811 (rex. 1982) (upholding a due on sale
clause against a challenge that the clause unreasonably restrained alienation).
295. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 907 (rex. 1982).
296. If the joint owners' percentages of ownership are uncertain or subject to dispute, the covenant may
simply identify the jointly owned property and the joint owners who are parties to the no-partition covenant.
297. 14 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d (Rev) §193.95 (1994).
298. See Davis v. Davis, 44 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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property to one of the joint owners. One joint owner can be empowered to
manage the property and to distribute the net profits from the property among
the joint owners according to their proportionate shares. Occasionally, formal
no-partition covenants also establish preemptive rights to purchase any joint
ownership interest offered for sale. Such a covenant may, for example, include
a provision such as the following:
This restriction against partition during such period does not deprive any
party of his right to convey or transfer his interest in the property to any
other person or entity. Such right is subject to the limitation, however,
that should any party desire to sell all or any part of his interest in the
property and find one or more third persons ready, able, and willing to
purchase the same, the other parties shall have the option to pur-
chase.' '29
the selling joint owner's interest for the amount of any bona fide offer made by
such third person or persons. Such a covenant may be recorded in county land
records to prevent bona fide purchasers from taking title free of the no-partition
covenant.
Many express agreements not to partition are contained in operating agree-
ments, which are frequently not recorded in Texas. According to the Texas
Supreme Court, "[i]t is not unusual for an operating agreement. .. to not be
placed of record." However, the court also noted that broad inquiry notice
is imposed on assignees, when assignments of mineral interests refer to earlier
equitable titles. "[R]eferences made in documents appearing in one's chain of
title bind a purchaser to what is contained in 'every recital, reference and reser-
vation contained in or fairly disclosed by any instrument which forms an essen-
tial link in the chain of title under which he claims."'' A more recent deci-
sion of the Texas Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of thoroughly
checking recorded mineral interest titles. In Day & Co., Inc., v. Texland Petro-
leum, Inc., the court found that the lessee of a second mineral lease was not a
bona fide purchaser.' The first mineral leasehold had been recorded, al-
though the recorded lease did not contain any indication that the lease might
have been forfeited. Recorded references to operating agreements may well
provide inquiry notice with regard to the terms of such operating agreements,
including the frequently included provisions in such agreements which restrict
or waive partition. 3
With regard to oil and gas interests, operating agreements and unitization
agreements present the most common context for no-partition agreements. A
typical provision in a unit agreement is reflected in the following "Waiver of
299. 14 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d (Rev) §193.95 (1994).
300. Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Trex. 1982).
301. Id. at 908, citing Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 250 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952, writ ref'd.).
302. Day & Company, Inc. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
303. See, e.g., MBank Abileen, N.A. v. Westwood Energy, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. 1986, no
writ). Cf. McSwain, Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil: New Uncertainties as to Scope of Title
Search, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 629 (1983).
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Rights to Partition" from West's Texas Forms: "Each party hereto agrees that,
during the existence of this Agreement, it will not resort to any action to parti-
tion the Unitized Formations or the Unit Equipment, and to that extent waives
the benefits of all laws authorizing such partition.""'4 The A.A.P.L. Model
Form Operating Agreement (Form 610-1982) contains a partition waiver in
Article VIII. E: "Waiver of Rights to Partition: If permitted by the laws of the
state or states in which the property covered hereby is located, each party hereto
owning an undivided interest in the Contract Area waives any and all rights it
may have to partition and have set aside to it in severalty its undivided interest
therein."' In Texas, the legality of such no-partition agreements and provi-
sions waiving partition in operating and unit agreements is rarely questioned.
When questioned in other contexts, Texas no-partition agreements have virtually
always been upheld and enforced.3
B. Implied Agreements Not to Partition
Most of the reported Texas cases with regard to no-partition agreements in
the context of jointy owned oil and gas and other mineral interests are con-
cerned with whether such a no-partition agreement should be implied. Most
Texas decisions which uphold and enforce implied agreements not to partition
in this context rely on the 1931 case of Elrod v. Foster."7 In Elrod the Court
of Civil Appeals approved a trial court's refusal to partition a mineral estate in
60 acres of land, "because a partition of the same, either in kind or by sale and
division of the proceeds, would have worked a cancellation of the oil and gas
lease contract, thereby depriving all parties to it of their respective rights in the
premises."'" The joint owner requesting partition had earlier agreed as part of
a lease contract to pay a proportionate part of drilling and development expens-
es on the jointly owned property.3" Because the agreements between the joint
owners concerned not only joint ownership, but also the joint development of
the jointly owned property, the court pragmatically concluded that the deal
made by the joint owners impliedly included a restriction against partition dur-
ing that joint development.1
The Court of Civil Appeals found that a joint owner who sought partition
was estopped in Elrod. The Court noted:
We think the proposition needs no extended discussion that a part owner
of a mineral estate in land, who has contracted with others having inter-
ests to pay his proportionate part of expenses of drilling and developing
the premises for oil and gas, cannot demand a partition of the mineral
estate so as to work a cancellation of the drilling contract, and thereby
304. 7A WEST'S TEXAS FORMS (J.S. Lowe, ed. 1997) § 14.2, Article 13.2.
305. 7 WEST'S TEXAs FORMS (J.S. Lowe, ed. 1997) § 13.2, Art. VIIIE.
306. See Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 442 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
307. 37 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931, writ ref'd.).
308. Id. at 342.
309. Id. at 341.
310. Id. at 342.
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relieve himself of his proportionate part of the expenses of developing the
lease. "
The estoppel against the joint owner who sought partition was based on two
particular contractual aspects of the joint ownership arrangement. First, the
court noted that the joint owner seeking partition knew about the drilling con-
tract and participated in it by accepting $1,500 for reassignment of a 3/128
interest assigned to him as security for a debt. Second, the court pointed to the
fact that the joint owner seeking partition failed to mention the unrecorded
contract until shortly before assignees of one of the original joint owners began
to drill a second well on the property."'
Moss & Urschel v. Clare"93 followed the Elrod decision in finding an im-
plicit agreement not to partition. In Moss & Urschel, the partition action arose
out of a dispute among joint owners over the drilling of an offset well."4 As
in Elrod, in Moss & Urschel, the relationship between the parties involved more
than joint ownership. It was a mining partnership to jointly operate a jointly
owned lease. The court found that contractual agreements among the joint own-
ers affected and restricted the otherwise implicit rights of the joint owners to
partition.1 5 Again, the nature of the deal made by the joint owners with re-
gard to the jointly owned property was an important factor in the court's find-
ing that there was an implied agreement not to partition.
Similarly, in Odstrcil v. McGlaun,316 the appeals court considered a deed
which reserved one-half of the minerals to the grantors, the McGlauns. The
deed also conveyed a power of attorney to the grantee, Birdwell, to execute oil
and gas leases with regard to the grantors' reserved half interest in the miner-
als. 317 When Birdwell later executed an oil and gas lease, the lease provided
that the delay rentals were to be paid directly to the lessor, Birdwell. This lease
was later assigned to Odstrcil and another person. The court decided that by
granting the power of attorney to lease all of the jointly owned minerals, the
McGlauns had impliedly agreed not to partition. The court noted that, although
"the right to partition is absolute it was never intended to interfere with con-
tracts that expressly or impliedly denied or limited that right."318 The court
concluded that
To now compel a partition of the minerals owned jointly ... would be to
abrogate the contract between them and deprive Birdwell of his right
under that contract to lease both his own and McGlaun's interest in the
minerals. By said contract McGlaun impliedly agreed not to partition and
311. Id. at 342.
312. See id. at 342.
313. 82 S.W.2d 1090 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935, writ ref'd).
314. Id. at 1091-1092.
315. Id. at 1092.
316. 230 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 354. The court also decided that Birdwell's lease was not authorized under the power of attor-
ney, and therefore it did not lease the McGlauns' half interest in the minerals.
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he is now estopped to assert such a right319
The nature of the deal between the joint owners again involved more than
merely joint ownership. The agreement not to partition was implied from the
other collateral agreements between the joint owners.
In Sibley v. Hill,3' an operating agreement between joint owners of two
oil and gas leases contained a preferential right to purchase, if any party to the
operating agreement wanted to sell its interest.' The court's decision again
followed the distinctive Texas two-step pattern. First the court saluted partition
as an inherent and absolute right of joint owners. Then the court abrogated that
right to partition based upon other contractual relationships among the joint
owners. In Sibley, the court noted that "It is true, as argued by appellants, that
the right of partition is absolute unless there is an expressed or implied agree-
ment not to partition." ' 2 But because of the particular arrangement created by
the joint owners in the operating agreement, partition was impliedly waived.2
The court's opinion focused on three features of the operating agreement which
indicated an implied agreement not to partition. First, the operating agreement
contained a preferential right to purchase. Second, the operating agreement was
long-term ("so long as oil, gas or other minerals were produced"). Third, the
operating agreement provided that notices were to be given by registered
mail.3' Since there had been no registered mail notice or offer of sale, the
court concluded that "Any partition by the trial court, either in kind or by sale
and division of the proceeds, would have worked a cancellation of the oil and
gas lease contract or, as in this case, the operating agreement." ' The Court
of Appeals relied on the Elrod decision, supra, as stating the law in Texas.
Contractual agreements to pay proportionate shares of the expenses of
drilling and developing oil and gas property are an appropriate basis from
which to imply an agreement not to partition. The Sibley court concluded, "The
provisions in the operating agreement of preferential right to purchase, and the
provision indicating a desire of the parties to retain the cotenancy status and
operational status during the life of the leases indicates to us a clear implication
that the absolute right of partition had been contracted away."" Again the
court looked beyond the simple fact of joint ownership to the larger objectives
and agreements shared by the joint owners.
Occasionally the nature of a joint owner's interest in oil, gas or other min-
erals will lead a court to imply an agreement not to partition. In Hulsey v. Keel,
the Court of Appeals held that partition of a mineral lease should be denied
because there was an express agreement between the joint owners that one joint
319. Id. at 354-355.
320. 331 S.W.2d 227 (rex. Civ. App. 1960).
321. Id. at 228-29.
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owner would have an assignable 1/16 free-carried interest which would continue
for the duration of the lease. 7 Since the lease was not yet fully developed,
the court pointed out that partition "would deprive Keel and his assigns of their
'free-carried' rights and at the same time relieve Hulsey and the other joint
owners of their obligation to develop, and the expenses of drilling, completion
and equipping.""8 Such a result would defeat the purposes of the agreement
between the joint owners and abrogate one joint owner's contractual right to a
free carried interest. The nature of this joint ownership interest was a proper
basis for finding an implied waiver of the joint owners' rights to partition.
The extent to which Texas courts will go to find an implied agreement not
to partition is illustrated in Long v. Hitzelberger3 In this case, the joint own-
ers had deliberately deleted from their operating agreement an express provision
waiving partition." ° But the appeals court nevertheless found an implied
agreement not to partition based on an agreement between the joint owners with
regard to well drilling. In Long, the implied agreement not to partition was
based on a drilling contract which required two wells to be drilled within four
years. The appeals court concluded that "[I]t must be inferred by such clear
language [in the drilling contract] that the parties did not intend for their estate
to be partitioned.""33 The court explained simply that, "[S]ince the drilling of
the second well is to be performed for the retention of Appellants' interest in
the leases, an agreement against partition must be implied."332 In dissent, Jus-
tice Dickenson, pointed out that it was odd to imply an agreement which the
joint owners had themselves deleted from their written agreement. He suggested
that it would be more appropriate to partition the property by sale of the jointly
owned working interests in the oil and gas leases. After the sale, leases would
remain subject to the overriding royalty interests and to all of the provisions of
the operating agreement, including the contractual right of reassignment to one
of the joint owners if the required wells were not drilled.333 But the majority
was undeterred from implying an agreement not to partition from the collateral
agreements among the joint owners with regard to drilling wells on the jointly
owned property.
C. When Agreements Not to Partition are Not Implied
In a rare decision refusing to imply an agreement not to partition, the
appeals court in Warner v. Winn3 found that, because a damage remedy for
breach of contract was available, it was unnecessary to imply an agreement not
to partition. The court explained, "It seems reasonably clear that when parties
327. 700 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. App. 1985, writ ref'd. n.r.e).
328. Id. at 258.
329. 602 S.W.2d 321 (rex. Civ. App. 1980).
330. Id. at 323 (Dickenson, . dissenting).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 324 (Dickenson, J., dissenting).
334. 191 S.W.2d 747 (rex. Civ. App. 1945, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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contract for the drilling of wells, and such drilling is either made the consider-
ation for the transfer of a mineral estate or is necessary to extend or perpetuate
a lease, it must be inferred that the parties to the drilling agreement did not
intend for the estate to be partitioned."3 But the joint ownership arrangement
before the court was different, since partition would not abrogate the parties'
collateral contractual agreements nor eliminate all remedy for breach. The court
offered this explanation:
[I]t can hardly be said that each and every covenant or provision relating
to property held in common carries with it the implication that no parti-
tion shall be had. Consequently, it is necessary in each case to examine
the particular contract involved and from the provisions thereof determine
whether or not the parties impliedly contracted against partition. If they
did not then the right of partition is absolute.3"
Because breach by one of the joint owners of his contractual promise to manage
and to operate the leases and well "is compensable in damages, an agreement
not to partition the property held by the parties will not be implied.3 37
Aside from Warner, Texas appellate courts have very rarely discussed the
circumstances under which a no-partition agreement should not be implied. In
Benson v. Fox,3" the Court of Civil Appeals ruled that two sisters who pur-
chased a vacant lot together and moved trailer homes into the center of the lot
and installed common utility lines, had not impliedly agreed not to partition. In
refusing to imply an agreement not to partition from the physical circumstances,
the court noted that "Where is no testimony by any witness that the partition
decreed by the court would destroy the estate sought to be partitioned." '339
Moreover, in Spires v. Hoover,' the appellate court refused to imply an
agreement not to partition from a "joint tenancy agreement" which provided for
survivorship rights in the joint owners. The court recognized the legitimacy of
such survivorship agreements among joint owners, but was unwilling to imply a
waiver of partition rights from the terms of the survivorship agreement. Al-
though the court expressed concern that partition might abrogate the contractual
rights of the joint owners with regard to survivorship, ultimately the appeals
court decided that partition would not interfere with the parties' reasonable
expectations with regard to survivorship. The court explained, "Partition of
lands means a division according to quantity and value.... There is no estate
or contractual interest involved to be increased or diminished. The partitioning
court can adjust the equities."'" The court was particularly concerned that
were the survivorship agreement construed as an agreement not to partition, it
might restrain partition for an unreasonable period of time. "Where is no time
335. Warner, 191 S.W.2d at 751.
336. Id. at 751.
337. Id.
338. 589 S.W.2d 823 (r'ex. Civ. App. 1979).
339. Id. at 826.
340. 466 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
341. Id. at 345, citing Zanderson v. Sullivan, 44 S.W. 484 (rex. 1898).
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limit imposed either express or implied," the court noted, citing Alabama and
Pennsylvania decisions for the proposition that "agreements for the perpetual
forbearance of a suit for partition are contrary to the policy of the law which
maintains the right of partition as an absolute right."342 Noting that partition
"clearly diminishes the estate of the appellee and certainly diminishes his con-
tractual interest," a dissenting Justice pointed out that the survivorship agree-
ment was limited to the lives of the two joint owners. 33
In Texas court decisions, disputes over whether there is an implied agree-
ment not to partition jointiy owned property are usually resolved by considering
the full context of the joint ownership arrangement, especially any contractual
or other relationship among the joint owners, beyond simply joint ownership. In
considering whether to imply an agreement not to partition, the approach of
Texas courts is typically pragmatic. Partition will be restrained if the court is
convinced that partition either would defeat the purposes of joint owners en-
gaged in a joint enterprise or would otherwise unreasonably devalue the jointly
owned property. Nevertheless, if restraining partition is of great importance to
joint owners, express no-partition agreements are a much more certain way to
avoid the otherwise nearly absolute right on the part of any joint owner to
partition.
VII. CONCLUSION
Breaking up joint ownership of oil and gas or mineral property through
partition can have serious consequences for joint owners, particularly with re-
gard to title and taxes. Indeed, Texas courts' enthusiastic enforcement of ex-
press and implied agreements not to partition undoubtedly reflects the under-
standing that compulsory partition can involve archaic, cumbersome and unpre-
dictable processes. Texas' multi-phased statutory partition-in-kind process, with
two appealable judgments and sometimes two jury trials, can be a particularly
costly, time-consuming and disruptive ordeal. Still, a joint owner's absolute
right to partition remains a fundamental attribute of joint ownership. Partition
provides an essential exit option for uncooperative joint owners who would
otherwise find themselves inextricably yoked together in joint ownership. It is a
vital escape route designed to prevent joint ownership from becoming a trap.
In light of the great value of mineral, oil and gas resources, Texas law
quite sensibly tailors partition of jointly owned oil and gas and other mineral
property in the distinctive ways described in this article. Instead of enforcing
the traditional, and in Texas statutory, presumption that jointly owned property
will be partitioned in kind, Texas courts usually partition jointly owned mineral
land and oil and gas property by sale. This preference for accomplishing parti-
tion through selling the whole of a jointly owned mineral estate or oil and gas
342. Id. at 347.
343. Id. (Preslar, J. dissenting).
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 33 Tulsa L.J. 763 1997-1998
764 TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:705
property avoids breaking up these scarce natural resources into potentially un-
economic, as well as possibly unequal, pieces.
Many joint owners of possessory oil and gas or other mineral interests
agree among themselves to restrict or to forego partition. They prefer to relin-
quish their partition rights in order to avoid the unpredictability, not to mention
the hardships and undesirable consequences, of partition. Given that the possi-
bility of partition is an inherent risk which automatically accompanies joint
ownership, Texas law has encouraged joint owners to control this risk through
the types of joint owner agreements discussed in this article.
Potential problems posed by partition seem not to have deterred the prolif-
eration of joint ownership arrangements with regard to oil and gas and other
minerals in Texas. Risks that partition will break up joint ownership seem to be
well-managed through ready enforcement by Texas courts of even very informal
agreements not to partition. After all, sharing in the profits from development
of oil and gas or of other mineral resources usually makes joint ownership of
these resources an attractive proposition.
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